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CHOICES AND INSTITUTIONS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
JON CANNON*
Responsiveness to the will of the people is not a unitary phenomenon that
can be embodied in a single institution.'
We do not yet have the necessary intellectual tools or models to understand
the array ofproblems that are associated with governing and managing
natural resource systems and the reasons why some institutions seem to
work in some settings and not others.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Collaborative, place-based initiatives are a central feature of the
efforts by the United States Environmental Protection Agency and other
federal agencies to reinvent environmental programs. These initiatives are
variously categorized as the ecosystem approach, community-based
environmental protection, or watershed management.3 They involve efforts
to establish shared environmental goals for a particular place or natural
system. Additionally, they seek to coordinate actions by federal, state and
local officials, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens to
achieve those goals. They place new emphasis on the federal government's
role as a facilitator or enabler, rather than as a top-down decisionmaker.
4
This paper examines the institutions' involved in one type of place-based
program-the "watershed approach" or watershed management.
* Professor of Law and Director of Environmental Law Programs, University of Virginia
School of Law. I would like to thank Brian Toth and Amy Lincoln for valuable research
assistance. I would also like to thank Jason Johnston, John Setear, Bradley Karkkainen,
and Christopher Sanchirico for insightful comments on earlier drafts.
I JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 155 (1997).
2 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 2 (1990).
3 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA's FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY-
BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1999); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY AND U.S.
DEP'T. OF AGRIC., CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PROTECTING AMERICA'S
WATERS, 73-75 (1998) (hereinafter Clean Water Action Plan); GEN. ACCT. OFF.,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1994); INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM MGMT. TASK FORCE, THE
ECOSYSTEM APPROACH: HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES (1995).
4 For a formative work setting forth this approach to environmental policymaking, see
DEWITr JOHN, CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM (1994).
5I use "institutions" broadly to include both governmental and non-governmental
organizations and "the laws, rules or shared strategies" that define those organizations.
Mark T. Imperial, Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The
Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 24 ENVTL. MGMT. 449, 453 (1999),
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The "watershed approach" is at the core of the Clinton
Administration's 1998 Clean Water Action Plan,6 and many states and
localities have adopted it as well. The National Research Council (NRC)
defines this approach as "an integrated, holistic problem-solving strategy
used to restore and maintain the physical, chemical, and biological integrity
of aquatic ecosystems, protect human health, and provide sustainable
economic growth."7 Among its "distinguishing characteristics," the NRC
lists broad stakeholder engagement, "use [of] consultation and consensus-
building techniques," and "a framework of intergovernmental and
interagency agreements ... [that] rely on a partnership approach rather than
laws or ordinances."8
This paper explores the capacity of the new generation of
collaborative institutions anticipated by the watershed approach to enhance
cooperation among often factious partners and to yield policies that fairly
reflect the preferences of the affected community. It asks: What defines a
successful collaborative effort? Under what circumstances is collaboration
likely to be more or less difficult? And finally, what is the role of central
government, with the ability to mandate centralized policy, in collaborative
institutions?
I explore these questions through an examination of the Chesapeake
Bay Program, a joint effort among three states, the District of Columbia, and
the federal government to restore the aquatic ecosystem of the Chesapeake
Bay watershed. The success of the Chesapeake Bay Program is apparent
from an increasingly elaborate and specific set of mutual undertakings
among the parties and from reductions in the costs of cooperation among
them. The program also shows some success in actually improving
conditions in the Bay, although the evidence is preliminary and a full
evaluation of the Program's environmental effectiveness must await future
results. I identify several factors as crucial to the success of the Chesapeake
Bay Program (in contrast to the poor showing of some other multi-state
basin management efforts), including the small number of partners on its
main policymaking body, the strength and relative compatibility of their
interests in the management of the Bay's resources, and substantial and
nuanced participation by the federal government. Based on this analysis, I
quoting S.E. Crawford & Elinor Ostrom, A Grammar of Institutions, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
582 (1995). They include the rules "used to determine who is eligible to make decisions in
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used,
[and] what procedures must be followed . " OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS,
supra note 2, at 51.
6 See CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN, supra note 3, at 73-88.
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argue for more flexibility, expanded regulatory authority and new measures
of accountability for the EPA in furtherance of a contextually sensitive
watershed policy, designed to minimize problems of fragmentation,
parochialism, and undue centralization of decision-making.9
Finally, I look beyond collaborative watershed institutions as
bargaining forums for existing interests to their transformative potential.
Watershed institutions may modify the interests of their institutional partners
in support of regional goals. They may also reshape preferences among
citizens of their watershed, fostering place-related values that are then
expressed through the traditional political process or through new forms "of
directly deliberative participatory democracy."' Finally, watershed
institutions may compete for resources outside the watershed with
established line environmental programs and with other place-based
programs in a way that alters our national sense of which environments are
most important to protect. All of these transformative possibilities require
further study, but they offer further reason for continued experimentation
with and hope for these emerging institutional forms.
II. WATERSHED CHARACTERISTICS, COMMUNITIES, AND INSTITUTIONS
I begin with three preliminary inquiries: defining watersheds; the
communities implicated in watershed decision-making; and the existing
institutional arrangements for watershed management.
9 Id. at 164-68; see also Helen M. Ingram, The Political Economy of Regional Watershed
Institutions, 55 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 10 (1973) (explaining the political viability
challenges faced by regional agencies and describing strategies employed by those
agencies to achieve political viability). Throughout this paper, I use "central" or
"centralized" as relative terms. "[I]n the United States, cities are 'decentralized' compared
to states and states are 'decentralized' compared to the federal government." Clayton P.
Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1347,
1351-52 (1997).
10 Charles Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism, 24 BOSTON REV. 5 (Oct.-Nov.
1999), at 4.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
A. Characteristics of Watersheds
Three features of watersheds are key to an institutional analysis.
First, watersheds, as is often noted, do not conform to the boundaries of
political jurisdictions." Most major river basins in this country cross state
lines and several are shared by Canada or Mexico. Second, watersheds are
multi-scalar. Smaller watersheds (e.g., the drainage area of a tributary) are
nested within larger watersheds (e.g., the drainage area of an entire river
system).' Impacts of human activity may be specific to a small watershed,
or they may implicate the larger system. Impacts also may vary along a
temporal as well as a spatial scale, with some problems becoming evident
immediately, and others taking longer (by years or decades) to materialize. 3
These relationships are further complicated by the phenomenon that "small
watersheds react to both natural and human changes more rapidly than large
watersheds,"' 4 so that impacts evident immediately at a small watershed
level may not become apparent at the large basin level until much later."
Finally, and related to this last point, watersheds are complex, dynamic
systems. Watershed conditions evolve through a series of interrelationships
among water, soils, vegetation, animals, land use, and human activities that
we do not fully understand and cannot completely predict. These
characteristics generally suggest the need for effective cooperation amongjurisdictions involved in watershed decision-making, or consolidation of
authorities in a central jurisdiction. They also suggest the importance of
learning and adaptability among institutions that make and implement
watershed policy.'6
I1 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 28.
12 "In general usage, .. . watershed refers to a drainage area along with its associated water,
soils, vegetation, animals, land use, and human activities." Id. at 39.
13 Id. at 47-51.
4Id. at 51.
15Id.
16 See generally J.B. Ruh], Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative
State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996) (arguing that law and society interact and develop in
response to one another and therefore one cannot "lead" the other, creating a need for more
complex analysis of their relationship); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a
Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by Making a Mess of
Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. REv. 933 (1997) (drawing an analogy between complex
natural systems and environmental legal systems).
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B. The Community in Interest
Defining the community in interest figures centrally in debates about
where watershed decisions should be made. The matching principle 7 (or
subsidiary principle) directs that environmental policy decisions should be
made at the smallest jurisdiction that encompasses all the significant benefits
and costs of those decisions. A decision-making jurisdiction that does not
encompass all the benefits and costs might be expected to ignore or
undervalue benefits and costs experienced by neighboring jurisdictions and
thus reach a less than optimal result.' At the same time, a decision-making
jurisdiction that is larger than necessary to encompass all the benefits and
costs might be expected to discount the preferences of those affected by the
decision or ignore relevant local conditions and thus also reach a less than
optimal result.' Thus, "[iun general, regulatory authority should go to the
political jurisdiction that comes closest to matching the geographic area
affected by a particular externality."2°
The community in interest consists of the people who bear the
significant costs and benefits of addressing a watershed issue. For a water
quality problem with only localized costs and benefits, this community
would be local." For problems affecting the larger aquatic system, however,
the relevant community might include not only watershed residents but also
others outside the watershed who benefit from its use or protection. In this
regard, impacts of watershed degradation can be psychological as well as
physical; the health of a lake or river may have value for people who do not
live on it and who may never even visit, if its degradation would leave them
17 See WALLACE OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 31-38 (1972); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan
Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 142 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (Symposium Issue).
18 This result could be avoided by bargaining between upstream and downstream
jurisdictions, but barriers to agreement under these circumstances may be substantial. See
infra text accompanying notes 144-150.
19 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv. 570, 589
(1996).
20 Butler & Macey, supra note 17, at 53.
21 Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495,
1554-55 (1999) ("When the impacts are geographically concentrated, such as the
management of a small watershed, regulation should be left to local or state officials.").
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feeling measurably worse off.2 Nationally prominent watersheds--such as
the Everglades, Lake Tahoe, or the Chesapeake Bay-might attract this kind
of interest. Our "interest in a distant environmental harm is also likely to be
determined," as Daniel Esty observes, "by the scope and severity of the
harm itself and our confidence that those on the scene are handling the
problem appropriately., 23
22 Id. at 1554; see also Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 543 (1997)
("[O]ut-of-state citizens place value on the existence of certain natural resources-even
resources that they never plan to use. Such existence, or non-use, values provide a powerful
justification for federal control over exceptional natural resources such as national parks.").
23 Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 19, at 641. In addition to
failing to consider physical and psychological spillovers, there may be other reasons that
"people on the scene" may not be expected to handle their environmental problems
"appropriately," thus evoking a response from outside. These include race-to-the-bottom
scenarios, public choice problems, and lack of information or administrative capacity at
the state and local level. Proponents of race-to-the-bottom theory argue that fiscal or
economic externalities are generated by competition among jurisdictions for economic
development, resulting potentially in less than optimal levels of environmental quality
across jurisdictions. Others vigorously reject the theoretical basis for the race-to-the
bottom, and argue instead that competition among jurisdictions, at both the state and
local levels, will aid in establishing the proper (optimal) balance between economic
development and environmental quality. In recent years, this debate has absorbed much
scholarly attention. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210, 1233-44 (1992); Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism,
supra note 19, at 627-38 (responding to Revesz); Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, supra note 22, at 594-97
(responding to Esty and others). As an empirical matter, issues over the extent to which
the race to the bottom actually occurs and, if so, whether it has an important effect on
environmental policymaking remain unresolved. Some public choice analysts contend
that, because of their higher costs of organizing relative to concentrated economic
interests, environmental interests will be underrepresented at the state and local levels.
See, e.g., Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, supra note 19, at 597-99. Others
argue to the contrary that environmental groups may be underrepresented at the federal
level. See Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A
Response to Critics, supra note 22, at 558-561. Still others say that they may be over-
represented at the federal level. Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA.
L. Ruv. 1321, 1328-29 (1997). A final set of concerns focuses generally on the
informational, technical and administrative capacity of state or local officials to set and
implement sound environmental policy. See, e.g., Esty, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, supra note 19, at 585-87, 613-24.
All these concerns remain open to debate as to their significance and, indeed, as to
which way they cut in addressing who should decide. I focus on externalities, and the
concepts of community that they suggest, because---as distinct from these other
concerns---they are well-established, even among commentators otherwise skeptical of
centralization, as factors that can drive suboptimal decisions and thus warrant consideration
384 [Vol.25:379
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These factors may expand the community in interest significantly
beyond the physical boundaries of the watershed. They are likely to be
relatively more substantial now than in the past because we have more
vividly presented information about places beyond our own. Therefore, we
are more likely to form significant attachments to those places and to have
concerns about them. As I will discuss later, there is evidence that
watersheds, or their human surrogates, actually compete for national
attention (and resources) in an effort to expand the community in interest. In
any event, based on this analysis, the community in interest is not the same
as the community of place (e.g., watershed inhabitants),24 and is potentially
national or international.
An expansive formulation of the community in interest, including
allowance for concerns of those outside the watershed, tends to support
centralized decision-making in watershed management. Richard Stewart
takes this a step further with his contention that, matching principle
notwithstanding, "many Americans regard environmental quality as an
important national good that transcends individual or local interest." 25 Thus,
"environmental programs should presumptively be federal unless
'centralization failure' dictates decentralization." ' 6
Those favoring local or regional empowerment discount the strength
or legitimacy of the interests of those outside the watershed, particularly to
the extent those interests are in the form of psychological or "existence"
values.27 They argue the virtues of public participation at the local level,
of cooperative or centralized solutions. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1211-12 (1992).24 Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY L.
Q. 771, 772-73 (1997).
25 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Quality as a National Good in a Federal State, 1997
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 210 (1997).
26 Id. at 213.
27 See, e.g., DONALD J. BOUDREAU AND ROGER E. MEINERS, Existence, Value and Life's
Other Ills, in WHO OWNs THE ENviRONmENT? 153, 67-69 (Peter J. Hill and Roger E.
Meiners eds., 1998) (arguing that existence values are difficult to quantify and that
"allegations of subjective utility" might be used in dry events as a basis for government
intervention); Steven Shavell, Contingent Valuation of the Nonuse Value of Natural
Resources: Implications for Public Policy and the Liability System, in CONTINGENT
VALUATION, A CRITIcAL AssEsSMENT 371, 380 (J. Hausman ed., 1993) (arguing against
using contingent valuation to estimate non-use values of natural resources because society
385
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which serves democratic values (in the Jeffersonian sense of direct
participation). They also point to the tendency of interactions among
citizens in stable communities to create "social capital"--norms of
reciprocity and trust-that support cooperative behavior." For
bioregionalists and other place-based theorists, this social capital is
intimately connected to the place inhabited by the community. It includes
an awareness among citizens of their common interest in the place (e.g., a
watershed) and norms of environmental stewardship or shared "sense of
place values." 29 Bryan Norton and Bruce Hannan contend that sense of
place value, strengthened by local autonomy, will yield environmentally
protective decisions at the local level and cooperative ("bottom-up")
solutions among localities on environmental matters of regional interest."
These competing claims about the relevant "community" drive much
of the debate over who should decide watershed issues. Their relative merit
depends heavily on context-the particular physical, biological, cultural,
political, and economic setting of the problems to be addressed. My interest
here is the capacity of institutions-and particularly emerging collaborative
arrangements-to respond to these claims in a contextually appropriate way.
C. Institutions of Watershed Management
Existing institutional arrangements for managing watersheds-what
one might call the institutional ecosystem-are complex. Two character-
istics of these arrangements are crucial to my analysis here: fragmentation
among decision-making authorities, and a dynamic of competition and
cooperation that characterizes relationships among those authorities.
already recognizes the non-use value of natural resources in many ways, and tort law
eliminates "hard-to-measure" components from damage awards).
28 See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (examining evidence that close-
knit groups develop norms that maximize the collective welfare of members); ELINOR
OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES & COMMON POOL RESOURCES 45 (1994) (discussing
importance of social capital in collective problems); DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING
ABouT CONSENSUS 39 (2000) (discussing how interaction among concerned citizens creates
social capital).
29 Bryan G. Norton & Bruce Hannon, Environmental Values: A Place-Based Theory, 19
ENVTL. ETHICs 227, 229-36 (1997); Bryan Norton & Bruce Hannon, Democracy and Sense
of Place Values in Environmental Policy, 3 PHIL. AND GEOGRAPHY 119, 120-25 (1999)(hereinafter Norton & Hannon, Democracy and Sense of Place Values); Robert W. Adler,
Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 1000-03 (1995); Roger
Bolton & Rodney C. Jensen, Regional Science and Regional Practice, 18 INT'L REGIONAL
Sci. REv. 133, 140-41 (1995).
30 See Norton & Hannon, Democracy and Sense of Place Values, supra note 29, at 135-37.
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1. Fragmentation
Existing resources and authorities for watershed management in the
United States are widely dispersed, both vertically (among the federal, state
and local levels) and horizontally (within levels). At the federal level,
regulatory authority is scattered among EPA (water quality), the Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (endangered
species), the Corps of Engineers (wetlands), and the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (hydroelectric projects). These regulatory
authorities are complemented (or contradicted) by a host of other federal
programs affecting watersheds, including management of federal lands,
subsidies and technical assistance to farmers for soil conservation and non-
point source controls,3' and programs for water resource development.32
States have a central role in implementing some of these federal
programs. For example, the great majority of states have been authorized to
administer permitting and enforcement authorities under the "cooperative
federalism" provisions of the Clean Water Act.33 In addition, each state has
its own set of regulatory authorities and programs for funding and project
development in watersheds. There is also a third level of regulatory and
funding programs at the local level. Localities in most states exercise
primary control over land use decisions affecting watershed health.34 This
multitude of government is mirrored by an even larger array of non-
governmental groups (NGOs), representing interests at federal, state and
local levels.
A closer look at the authorities and resources for protecting water
quality reveals the extent of fragmentation of authorities within this system.
The federal Clean Water Act announces water quality goals for the nation,
including an "interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in
31 NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 169-181.
32 See William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 483, 491 (1994) (describing the agencies involved in undertaking, funding,
supervising, and approving water resources development projects, and the reasoning behind
various development projects).
33 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1994).
34 See James H. Wickersham, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New Model
for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 489, 502-04 (1994)
(discussing local inability to handle large projects and protect critical resources).
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and on the water."35 Under the Act, states are to develop water quality
standards for each water body or stream segment within their borders, and
EPA reviews those standards to ensure that they are consistent with the
purposes of the Act.
The Act also requires the EPA to establish nationally uniform
technology-based pollution limits for classes and categories of industrial and
municipal dischargers ("point sources").36 Permits issued to point source
dischargers are to reflect the technology-based limits applicable to the
dischargers' class or category as well as any more stringent limits to ensure
achievement of water quality standards in the receiving water.37 The great
majority of these permits are issued by states authorized to administer the
federal program. Issuance of permits remains subject to EPA review.
The EPA's regulatory authority is limited to "point source"
discharges--discharges of pollutants through "discrete conveyances" that
typically involve industrial or municipal sources.3" The EPA has no direct
authority to regulate non-point source discharges of pollutants from diffuse
sources-such as stormwater runoff from farmland, woodlots, or residential
areas-which are closely related to land use patterns and practices. Instead,
Congress has authorized a grant program under which the EPA disburses
funds for use by states that have developed, and received EPA approval of
non-point source management programs.39 Non-point source pollution is the
main cause of forty percent or more of the remaining water quality problems
in the United States. 4 Thus, land use practices affecting non-point source
pollution, under primary local and state control, are key to realizing the
nationally proclaimed water quality goal.
Under the matching principle, these arrangements for protecting
water quality have been criticized as both over- and under-centralized. Why
should the EPA oversee the setting of water quality standards for a local
watershed, even where there is no indication that the standards will affect
interests outside the watershed?4' Why are water quality goals national
35 33 U.S.C. § 125 l(a)(2) (1994).
36 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1)(A) (1994).
37 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
38 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
39 33 U.S.C. § 319(h) (1994); 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1329(h) (1994).
40 EPA Office of Water, Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation's Water Quality Problem,
at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/pointl.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2000).
41 Myrick Freeman, Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 125-27 (P. Portney ed., 1990); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171, 192 (1988).
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rather than watershed-specific? Why do localities control land use, even
where it may affect water quality basin-wide?
The fragmentation of authorities affecting watersheds, both
horizontally and vertically, complicates the process of making and
implementing watershed policy. However, as I discuss in the next section, it
may have important benefits. Competition and cooperation among agencies
and jurisdictions in a political theater can help select the best decisionmaker
or best combination of decisionmakers for a given problem and assist the
public assessment of the policies chosen. It can also helps determine
whether collaboration among jurisdictions is to be preferred over centralized
exercise of authority.
2. Institutional Bargaining
The institutional ecosystem is not static. Each of the institutional
players in watershed management has its own set of interests, which it seeks
to advance against the often competing interests of others. This institutional
competition occurs among different levels of government (e.g., between
EPA and its state counterparts) as well as among agencies at the same level
of government (e.g., EPA and the Department of Agriculture) and among
co-equal jurisdictions (e.g., states). Non-governmental organizations with
interests in watershed management also compete against each other and
against government actors as well.
The EPA's institutional interests include advancing policies that are
environmentally protective and maintaining control over matters within its
purview." State and local environmental agencies may have similar
interests, but their constituencies will differ from EPA's, and their policy
agendas will differ accordingly. Moreover, to the extent that they too are
interested in maximizing their control, their interests will be at odds with
EPA's (and with those of any other agency whose actions challenge their
control). Other agencies (including water resource development agencies),
legislative bodies, and NGOs bring an even broader array of interests into
the field of watershed policy and institutional combat. The strength and
42 Jon Cannon, Bargaining Politics and Law in Environmental Regulation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Kurt Deketelaere & Eric W. Orts eds., 2000).
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variety of interests ensure that watershed politics are often about more than
turf; they are about "real differences." 43
Competition is often accompanied by negotiation, as institutions
seek to resolve their differences to their mutual benefit. As we have seen, no
one government agency or jurisdiction has all the resources and authorities
needed to deal with the complex issues of watershed management. By
cooperating, diverse entities may be able to advance their agendas beyond
what they could otherwise accomplish with their own limited resources and
authorities, particularly in the face of continued opposition from others.
Thus, there are often incentives to work out differences. In the EPA's case,
reaching an agreement might involve ceding some control that it might
otherwise be in a position to claim in order to increase program effectiveness
or reduce the risk of overriding actions by Congress or the executive.
The bargains struck may fall short of full and faithful implement-
ation of the law. Daniel Farber concludes that "under the Clean Water Act,
states have found it possible to dodge or disobey federal mandates
outright." Farber believes it "quite possible that full implementation of
uniform national standards would be undesirable [because of variations in
local conditions and preferences], but that partial implementation is useful as
a safeguard against local regulatory breakdowns." '5 This analysis suggests
that fragmentation of resources and authorities and patterns of competition
and negotiation among diverse institutions can yield solutions for particular
watersheds that are efficient or welfare-maximizing. 46 This might be the
case notwithstanding initial allocations of decision-making authority that
can be criticized as less than ideal. From this "neo-Madisonian" perspect-
ive, our present system-although certainly capable of improvement--offers
43 DeWitt John, Good Cops, Bad Cops, 24 BOSTON REv. 5 (Oct.-Nov. 1999), at 16.
"Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in
Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 297, 304 (1999).
45 Id. at 317. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE
L.J. 931, 985 (1997) (explaining
why the 'law in books' does not necessarily coincide with the 'law in
action.'... The reality is that a legal system does not act like a machine,
automatically churning out the prescribed response to identified
problems. Instead, it represents a kind of regulatory commons, where
effective action is dependent upon alliances of groups overcoming
collective action barriers and pressuring administrators to respond).
46 See ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS
AND PUBLIC FINANCE 24 (1996) (concluding that competition among government
entities-both horizontal and vertical-leads to efficient results, assuming the ability of the
public or some portion of it periodically to express its desires at the ballot box); see Esty,
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, supra note 21, at 1556-57 (noting that
competition creates pressure on regulating entities to perform their duties more efficiently
and brings more information into the policy process).
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a version of watershed democracy.47 The next section addresses the
potential of collaborative watershed institutions to improve upon it.
III. WATERSHED INSTITUTIONS
Numerous versions of watershed institutions have been advanced
over the years.4" In the late nineteenth century, John Wesley Powell
advocated that settlement in the arid west be organized within
"'hydrographic basins,' or watershed units... rather than by the prevailing
township and county system."'49 Reflecting the dominant values of his time,
Powell's proposal was designed to facilitate publicly controlled
development of water resources for irrigation-a "technological
democracy"5°--not to protect the ecological health of aquatic systems. It
was never adopted, and there do not appear to be serious proposals at present
to reorganize local governments in the United States along watershed lines,
5
'
although New Zealand has taken that step.52
More recently, through the early 1980s, the states and the federal
government experimented with a series of basin commissions established by
interstate compact. Some of these commissions exercise planning and
regulatory authorities ceded by member state and federal governments, with
the ability to bind member jurisdictions on less than unanimous vote.53
Although they have achieved some success in crafting region-wide policies,
47 See Imperial, Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management, supra note 5, at
459 (citing "neo-Madisonian" arguments for deliberative processes that preserve
competition among jurisdictions and agencies as "more democratic than simply giving one
agency the authority to impose its will on the others").
48 For historical accounts of the evolution of watershed management in the United States,
see BETSY REIKE & DOUG KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE WATERSHED LEVEL:
REPORT TO THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, app. A (1997);
Adler, supra note 29, at 1000; Goldfarb, Watershed Management.: Slogan or Solution,
supra note 32, at 486-89.49 DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE 138 (1941).
50 Id. at 134.
51 See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY 204 (1974) (explaining the unfeasibility of elected watershed governments in this
country).
52 See Resource Renewal Institute, Case Study: New Zealand's Resource Management Act,
at http://www.rri.org/envatlas/oceania/new-zealand/nz-index.html.
53 See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission, at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/drbc.htm.
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
the river basin commissions have been less than impressive as engines of
regional governance. Rather than representing the interests of the region,
members of these interstate bodies have acted more typically as representing
the interests of their respective jurisdictions. 4 To the extent that the river
basin commissions required transferring authority away from federal and
state agencies, their efforts were often undermined by those same agencies."5
Voting rules notwithstanding, these commissions have often found it
necessary to proceed by consensus.5 6 Their experience suggests, as Helen
Ingram observed more than two decades ago, that "political considerations
cannot be sidestepped by granting a regional organization more formal
authority[;j... decisions are going to be made by a process of negotiation
and consent-building, not by the fiat of a regional agency. 57  Perhaps
because of the political costs to create and maintain them and their mixed
record of success, "very few of [the recently emerging organizational
arrangements for watersheds] have sought to transfer powers and authorities
from existing agencies to a watershed authority 58 and have focused instead
on less formal collaborative institutions. Such institutions are described as
"polycentric "" or "networked," in contrast to centralized arrangements.
A. Collaborative Institutions
Collaborative watershed efforts, like other multi-party efforts to
provide or protect a collective good, must confront the problem that rational
parties, acting in their own self-interest, may refuse to cooperate, even where
54 See, e.g., Michael McGinnis, On the Verge of Collapse: The Columbia River System,
Wild Salmon and the Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63, 91
(Winter 1995) ("Cooperation between key participants is often predicated on where one
lives and which interests are represented in a particular NPPC decision-making situation...
There is no regionwide preservation ethos."); ACKERMAN ET AL., supra note 5 1, at 201
(offering experiences of the Delaware River Basin Commission as evidence "that powerful
forces divert state and national politicians from the regional implications of their decisions,
despite the fact that these politicians sit [or are represented on] a 'regional' agency").55 NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 183.
5 6 See, e.g., Delaware River Basin Commission, at http://www.state.nj.us/drbc/drbc.htm..
57 Ingram, supra note 9, at 17.
5 8 NAT'L RE . COUNCIL, supra note 7, at 186.
59 Philip R. Wandschneider, Managing River Systems: Centralization Versus Decentral-
ization, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1043, 1055 (1984); Imperial, Institutional Analysis and
Ecosystem-Based Management, supra note 5, at 458-59.
60 Errol E. Meidinger, Laws and Institutions in Cross-Boundary Stewardship, in
STEWARDSHIP ACROSS BOUNDARIES 87, 97-99 (Richard L. Knight & Peter B. Landres, eds.,
1998); Lee Breckenridge, Reweaving the Landscape. the Institutional Challenges of
Ecosystem Management for Lands in Private Ownership, 19 VT. L. REV. 363, 402 (1995).
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each would gain from joint action;61 transaction costs may keep the parties
from achieving a mutually beneficial result. One well-known formulation of
this problem is the prisoner's dilemma game. In the two-player prisoner's
dilemma game, each party has the choice of defecting or cooperating. The
game is structured so that each player will be better off if both cooperate
than if both defect. But, perversely, assuming that the game is played only
once and that the parties have no way to make enforceable threats or
commitments, the dominant strategy of each player is to defect, because she
is better off defecting regardless of what the other player does.62 If the
parties know that they will play repeatedly, however, then each party's
ability to punish a defection by defecting herself in a later round may lead to
mutually beneficial cooperation.63 Cooperation may also occur in repeat or
iterated prisoner dilemma games involving multiple parties, although it will
be more difficult as the number of parties increases because of increased
transaction costs. The prisoner's dilemma represents only one among a
variety of possible incentive structures for multi-party watershed issues,'
but it serves to illustrate how parties with the ability to affect watershed
conditions, each acting rationally in its own interest, might produce
suboptimal results. By reducing transaction costs among the parties, the
61 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1-2 (1965). For purposes of this
discussion, I assume that private individuals as well as public officials representing
collective bodies such as states and agencies act from rational self-interest. As discussed
infra at notes 76-95, however, I assume rational self-interest may be strongly affected by
"social norms," Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 908-09 (1996), such as norms of cooperation and of environmental stewardship.
See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice Versus Republican Moment Explanations
for Environmental Laws, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 29, 42 (1998) (noting that the
"boundaries between rational choice and some alternatives tend to blur as the concept of
self interest thins out").
62 The payoffs are structured so that if one player cooperates and the other defects, the
cooperator will be worse off than if she had also defected, and the defector will be better off
than if both had cooperated. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-11
(1984); ELLICKSON, supra note 28, at 159-162.
63 AXELROD, supra note 62, at 27-54; ELLICKSON, supra note 28, at 164-65, 167-83, 225-
29.
64 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 28, at 56. See also Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the
Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 384, 389-92 (1996) (discussing other game structures-such as the stag
hunt and chicken--of likely relevance to water resource management).
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rules, norms, or shared strategies that define collaborative institutions can
facilitate effective cooperation and welfare-maximizing watershed policy.65
Mark Imperial identifies three types of transaction costs that
collaborative ecosystem management institutions might address: the costs
"of searching for and organizing information" (information costs); the costs
of "negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements" (coordination costs);
and the costs of controlling strategic behavior by participants that may
impede cooperative solutions (strategic costs).66 To the extent they function
to promote cooperation, a measure of the effectiveness of collaborative
institutions is how well they reduce these costs. Institutional effectiveness
might also be measured by whether the watershed has actually benefited
from cooperative undertakings and whether the parties have been able to
minimize costs.
IV. THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM-UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS
The Chesapeake Bay Program is among the most sophisticated and
sustained watershed management efforts. Commentators also generally
recognize it as among the most successful.67 Measured against our criteria
for institutional effectiveness, it provides a useful indicator of both the
promise and limitations of collaborative watershed institutions.
A. The Watershed and the Program
The Chesapeake Bay is a large estuary of the Susquehanna River
with major tributaries feeding it from New York, Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. The main stem of the Susquehanna,
which provides about fifty percent of the freshwater flow to the Bay, runs
through Pennsylvania; the shoreline of the Bay itself is shared between
Maryland and Virginia. These three states, along with the District of
Columbia and the federal government (through the EPA and other agencies),
are the major jurisdictions in interest on the Bay. The Bay's 64,000 square
65 See John K. Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 193, 200
(1999) (exploring development of collaborative institutions in global context); Imperial,
Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management, supra note 5, at 458-59.
66 Imperial, Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management, supra note 5, at 456.
67 ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., LESSONS FROM LARGE WATERSHED PROGRAMS (2000)
(report to National Research Council, New Strategies 195) ("This voluntary approach with
comnitments to goals and deadlines has so far been successful."); Mark Imperial et al., An
Evolutionary Perspective on the Development and Assessment of the National Estuary
Program, 20 COASTAL MGMT. 311, 324 ("The success of the Chesapeake Bay Program
makes it a good model for the management of regional water bodies."); Sabel et al., supra
note 10, at 4, 7.
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mile watershed is home to about 15.5 million people; of these, 14.6 million
live in the District, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.6"
The origins of the Chesapeake Bay Program are variously described.
Some commentators have stressed the role of the "broad citizen movement"
that developed in response to deteriorating conditions in the Bay and
resulted in formation of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation in 1966;' 9 other
accounts have stressed the political entrepreneurship of elected officials such
as Senator Charles Mathias of Maryland.70 In any event, Congress funded a
six-year study conducted by the EPA to determine the status and causes of
the Bay's decline. Completed in 1983, the study showed "declines in living
resources and submerged aquatic vegetation, increased nutrient loadings
[with corresponding reductions in dissolved oxygen levels critical for key
aquatic species], and elevated levels of toxic contaminants."'" In the same
year the study was released, Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, the District
of Columbia, EPA and the Chesapeake Bay Commission (an advisory body
composed of state legislators, agency heads and citizen representatives)
signed the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, pledging their cooperation to restore
and protect the Bay.72 The signatories have amended the agreement three
times since then, in 1987," 3 1992,74 and 2000.
71
These agreements establish a series of mutual goals, objectives and
commitments to coordinate the efforts of the 'signatories. These include
"governance" provisions, which commit the parties to meet annually, to
support ongoing monitoring, research and data management programs, and
68 Population Estimates and Projections for Portions of States in the Chesapeake Bay
Drainage Basin, at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/info/popstate.htm.
69 Sabel et al., supra note 10, at 7.
70 Chesapeake Bay Program Chesapeake Bay Restoration, at http://www.chesapeakebay.
net/info/restrtn.cfrn.
71 Imperial et al., An Evolutionary Perspective on the Development and Assessment of the
National Estuary Program, supra note 67, at 323.
72 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 1983 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/pubs/1983chesapeakebayagreement.pdf.
73 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/pubs/199.pdf.
74 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT 1992 AMENDMENTS, at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/1992ChesapeakeBayAmendments.pdf.
75 Chesapeake Bay Program, Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/agreementhtm.
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"to develop and maintain effective mechanisms for accountability. '76 They
also include policy provisions, perhaps the best known of which is the
commitment, first announced in the 1987 Agreement, to achieve a forty
percent reduction in nutrient loadings to the main stem of the Bay by 2000."7
That undertaking was accompanied by related commitments to reduce non-
point source pollution (agricultural runoff) and to control growth.78 In the
1992 Agreement, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to reduce nutrient
loadings by forty percent by 2000 and agreed to develop and begin
implementation of tributary-specific nutrient strategies by August 1993 in
order to meet that commitment.79 In the 2000 Agreement, the forty percent
reduction goal is reaffirmed once again, and the parties agree, in addition, to
"correct the nutrient-and sediment-related problems in the Chesapeake Bay
and its tidal tributaries" by 2010.80 The 2000 Agreement specifies additional
commitments (with performance measures and target dates) on sediment
reduction, land use controls, habitat restoration (submerged aquatic
vegetation, wetlands, riparian forest buffer), and increasing oyster
populations.8' Each of the succeeding agreements has reaffirmed or revised
prior commitments and added commitments to advance the underlying goals
of preserving and restoring the Bay.
The progressively more elaborate and specific formulations among
the parties provide some indication by themselves of successful institution-
building in a cooperative setting.82 The successive adjustments in the
parties' objectives and commitments also indicate the ability to respond to
new information about conditions in the watershed and the success (or
failure) of prior program measures. Thus, they offer evidence that the
76 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 73.
77 The 2000 nutrient reduction goal was substantially achieved throughout most of the Bay,
although reduction targets for lower tributaries on the Virginia side in the James and
Rappahannock Rivers are not expected to be met for several years. Interview with William
Matuszeski, Director, Chesapeake Bay Program (Feb. 10, 2000).
78 See 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 73 (stating an objective to "reduce
the levels of nonpoint sources" and a commitment "to develop and adopt a basin-wide
implementation strategy" for control of pollutants from "point and nonpoint sources" and a
commitment to "adopt development policies and guidelines designed to reduce adverse
impacts of the water quality and living resources of the Bay").79 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT: 1992 AMENDMENTS, supra note 74.
80 Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, supra note 75.
81 Id.
82 See Setear, supra note 65, at 197-204. See also Merrill, supra note 45, at 972-73
(explaining that as the mutual benefits of overcoming collective action problems "become
progressively larger, the institutional response will become progressively more sophisticated
(i.e., more costly)").
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program meets the criteria of learning and adaptability as well as
cooperation. 3
The core decision-making body of the program is the Executive
Council, which consists of the Governors of Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, the Administrator of EPA, the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, and the Chair of the Chesapeake Bay Commission. The
Executive Council meets together at least once a year. By custom, at least
until last year, the principals themselves are present and meet for some
period of time by themselves, without staff.4 This custom allows frank
exchange to occur and facilitates bargaining." These meetings typically
result in Executive Council Directives, which are joint directives to the
respective staffs of the states and the EPA to undertake implementing
actions in furtherance of the agreed upon commitments and goals. Although
the directives themselves are not legally enforceable, they function as
executive orders within the states and provide further specificity of
commitment against which the performance of the parties can be
measured. 6
A number of advisory committees, informal relationships, and
outreach efforts help connect the Executive Council to the program's
various constituencies. Although the Executive Council is dominated by
state and federal officials, it receives views directly from a Local
Government Advisory Committee87 and from a twenty-three member
Citizens Advisory Committee,8 which the program has characterized, in an
83 See also text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
84 Interview with William Matuszeski, Director, Chesapeake Bay Program (Feb. 10, 2000).
85 Id.
86 The "collaborative" or "voluntary" nature of decision-making at the level of the
Executive Council does not mean the absence of coercive elements in the program.
Governmental parties with regulatory and tax-and-spend authorities, having agreed to a
joint strategy, are expected to implement that strategy by exercising their respective
authorities.
87 Members on this committee, which represents the local governments in the Chesapeake
Region, are appointed by the Governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and the
Mayor of the District of Columbia. Chesapeake Bay Program, Local Government Advisory
Committee, at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/conittee.htm.
88See Chesapeake Bay Program, Citizens Advisory Committee, at http://www.
chesapeakebay.net/cac.htm.
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exuberant moment perhaps, as "the voice of the people." 9 The program
draws on the work of ten additional policy and technical committees as well
as attendant subcommittees, work groups, and task forces.9" Seeking to
enhance the program's effectiveness at the local level, the Executive Council
recently launched a "Community Watershed Initiative,"' premised on the
dual notion that successful implementation of the program's goals "will only
happen if there is active involvement of the community at the subwatershed
scale" and that strategies "must reflect the unique characteristics of the local
watersheds and their human inhabitants."92 The program has encouraged
"tributary teams ' 93 composed of local stakeholders and recruited citizen
water quality monitors. The program also relies, for input, political support,
and implementation assistance, on a host of non-governmental organizations
at the regional and local levels. These NGOs include the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, an "advocacy organization with over 80,000 members
throughout the Bay watershed and nationwide,"94 and its counterpart, the
Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay (Alliance), a non-advocacy group
promoting "partnerships" among diverse interest groups.95 The creation of
the citizen monitor network was a joint undertaking of the program and the
Alliance.
B. Reducing Transaction Costs
This overview of the Chesapeake Bay Program suggests its capacity
to reduce all three types of transaction costs that we identified earlier
(information, coordination, and strategic costs). In addition to the six-year
study that catalyzed the initial agreement, ongoing investments by the
program in scientific research, monitoring, and reporting facilitate continued
cooperation. The program also leverages the collection and dissemination of
data from other governmental bodies, academic institutions, and citizen
89 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, THE STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: A REPORT TO THE
CITIZENS OF THE BAY REGION 6 (1999).
90 ADLER ET AL., supra note 67.
91 CHESAPEAKE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, DIRECTIVE No. 97-3: COMMUNITY WATERSHED
INITIATIVE (Oct. 30, 1997) at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/824.pdf.
92 Id.
93 Telephone interview with Richard Batiuk, Deputy Director, Chesapeake Bay Program
(May 5, 2000).
94 Hearing on Estuaries and Coastal Quality, Before the House Comm. on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcomm. on Water Resources, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of
William Baker, President, Chesapeake Bay Foundation) at http://www.house.gov/transport
ation/ctisubs.html.
95 Alliance for the Chesapeake Bay, Mission and Background, at http://www.acb-online.
org/mission.htm.
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monitors. Its networked organizational form enhances its ability not only to
disseminate centrally developed information, but also to collect information
on conditions in local watersheds that might otherwise be difficult to obtain,
although the results of citizen monitoring are not yet fully integrated with
state and federal monitoring at larger scales.96
The program also helps reduce coordination costs among the parties.
As the core policymaking body, the Executive Council plays a dominant
integrating role, but policy coordination occurs throughout the program's
networked structure. The Chesapeake Bay Commission, for example,
orchestrates legislative strategies across the three signatory states, including
the successful campaign for joint adoption of a ban on phosphate in
detergents. The EPA consults with, and negotiates among, some two dozen
other federal agencies with diverse interests in the Bay,97 as well as its state
counterparts. Interactions within the program's elaborate committee
structure, and between the committees and program staff, contribute to
common understanding of issues and reduce political barriers to
cooperation.98 While varying in effectiveness across the watershed, tributary
teams provide at least some measure of local coordination. Regional and
local NGOs participate, monitor, pressure, inform, and mobilize the public.
The program's tiered structure, involving federal, state, and local
governments as well as NGOs at the regional and local watershed levels,
helps coordinate efforts at multiple scales and ensure that decisions are made
at the "right" level."
The program's coordinating capacity benefits from a permanent,
expert program staff, including a director with substantial experience in high
level intergovernmental negotiations. Of a program staff of about seventy-
five people, only one-third are from the EPA, "with the remainder coming
from other federal agencies, state agencies, and academic institutions."'"
Thus, the program office provides yet another forum for integration among
96 Telephone interview with Richard Batiuk, Deputy Director, Chesapeake Bay Program
Office (May 5, 2000).
97 See AGREEMENT OF FEDERAL AGENCIES ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE
CHESAPEAKE BAY (July 14, 1994) at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/94fed.htm.
98 See Benvenisti, supra note 64, at 411-12 (discussing depoliticizing effects of interactions
between "scientists and low-level officials" in international setting).
99 Telephone interview with Richard Batiuk, Deputy Director, Chesapeake Bay Program
Office (May 5, 2000).
100 ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 87.
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various state and federal agencies and the EPA. The staff develops options
and explores potential grounds of agreement among the parties to pave the
way for successful engagements among the members of the Executive
Council, broker resolutions among the parties not warranting attention by
the Council, and defuse issues that might otherwise become controversial
among the parties. The staff also provides the means to monitor
implementation, ensuring that instances of non-compliance are brought to
the attention of others and dealt with.''
The relationship between the core decision-making group and these
ancillary forums is complex and reciprocal. The self-constituting Executive
Council reduces the collaborative challenge to manageable size and provides
an authoritative framework that legitimizes, supports, and channels the
efforts of hundreds of program participants. At the same time, the Council
is both informed and constrained by what goes on in the program's ancillary
forums.10
2
Finally, although the Chesapeake Bay Agreement does not provide a
means for its enforcement, the norms of mutual dependence and cooperation
that have been developed in the course of the program offer some protection
against forms of strategic behavior such as free riding.0 3 The custom of
yearly face-to-face (and private) meetings among the principals on the
Council supports the maintenance of a stable cooperative regime. Principals
may be subject to personal rebuke and possible retaliation by their peers on
the Council if they are seen to have defaulted on their responsibilities.
Failure of principals to abide by program commitments against an
established expectation of cooperation may also have political implications
within their home jurisdictions. Norms of cooperation evidenced in Council
deliberations reinforce and are reinforced by cooperative behavior in the
program's many ancillary forums."14
The political force of regional program commitments was evident
recently in Virginia's enactment of legislation "to achieve no net loss" of
wetlands.' The program established a no-net-loss goal in 1988.106 Both
1o' See David G. LeMarquand, Preconditions to Cooperation in Canada-United States
Boundary Waters, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 221, 232 (1986) (discussing staff's role in
addressing issues "before they become too politicized").
I2 1 am indebted to Bradley Karkkainen for his suggestions in fleshing out the depth and
complexity of the coordinating process within the program.
103 Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, supra note 75.
104 See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
1o5 VA. SB 648, (amending VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Michie 1998)), available at
http://www.legl .state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504exe?001+fultCHAP1032.
106 Chesapeake Bay Program, Wetlands Restoration and Preservation, at http://www.
chesapeakebay/net/wet.htm.
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Pennsylvania and Maryland enacted legislation in furtherance of this goal,
but Virginia did not.10 7 As long as the federal wetlands program, which also
had adopted a goal of"no net loss,"'0 8 was effective in Virginia, the absence
of state legislation was not critical. In two federal courts of appeals cases,
decided in 1997"° and 1998,"'0 however, the scope of the federal wetlands
program was significantly curtailed, increasing the vulnerability of Virginia
wetlands and prompting a vigorous public debate over whether state
legislation was necessary to fill the gaps and, if so, what kind of legislation it
should be. Arguments by proponents for a strong, no-net-loss state
regulatory program invoked the Baywide policy and the legislation already
adopted by Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Roanoke Times editorialized
that Virginia was "lagging shamefully behind" its "partners in cleaning up
the Chesapeake Bay."' " The legislature passed a strong, no-net-loss version
of the legislation, and the Governor, after remaining studiously non-
committal during the legislative debates, signed it with minor
amendments." 2  Thus, advocates for strong state wetlands legislation
successfully leveraged regional commitments, along with other arguments
for passage, in the political debate.
The Chesapeake Bay Program illustrates the "reinvented" role of
federal agencies envisioned by place-based environmental protection-
particularly as it involves facilitation (reducing transaction costs) among
potentially cooperating parties. In addition to the EPA as a member of the
Executive Council, a number of federal agencies have contributed to this
effort. Federal funds underwrote the initial studies that led to the creation of
107 Caleb Jaffe, Note, Regulating Our Common Wetlands: An Analysis of the Birth of the
Virginia Nontidal Wetlands Resources Act of 2000 at 28-29 (May 2000) (paper on file with
author).
108 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
109 See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that authority for
federal wetlands protection does not extend to "isolated" wetlands; although the United
States has not acquiesced in the Fourth Circuit's ruling outside the court's jurisdiction, states
in the Fourth Circuit, like Virginia, are affected).
'
10 See National Mining Association v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (holding that federal wetlands regulation does not extend to excavation or
channelization of wetlands but is limited to discharge of dredged or fill material).
III Editorial, A Wetlands Protection Plan Drained of its Wetlands, ROANOKE TIMEs, Feb. 1,
2000. For other public statements to the same effect, see Jaffe, supra note 107 at 28-31.
112 VA. SB 648, at http://www.legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001+fuItCHAP1032.
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the program," 3 and they continue to support research and monitoring of the
Bay, educational efforts, and program office staffing-all essential
components of the collaborative success.114  Federal resources and
authorities also play a role in encouraging (or disciplining) parties that might
otherwise be disinclined to carry out their agreements and in catalyzing
further cooperative undertakings among the parties. For example, under the
federal Clean Water Act, for water bodies not meeting water quality
standards (impaired waters), states must establish total maximum daily
pollutant loadings (TMDLs) consistent with attaining the standards and
assign those loadings among contributing sources."5 TMDLs for the main
stem of the Bay, portions of which are listed as impaired,116 must be
completed by 2010.117 In response, Executive Council members have agreed
upon an aggressive joint strategy to meet water quality standards in the main
stem of the Bay before the deadline, thus rendering the federally mandated
TMDLs unnecessary.'
C. Trouble in Paradise
Despite evidence of success, the Chesapeake Bay Program has
encountered difficulties, which suggest the limits of collaboration on the
Bay. In particular, the program has struggled to control strategic behavior,
particularly in the area of land use, which is the traditional prerogative of
state and local governments and over which the federal government has little
regulatory leverage to induce cooperative behavior. The 1987 Agreement
adopted a goal to "plan for and manage the adverse environmental effects of
human population growth and land development in the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed."" 9  Both Virginia and Maryland adopted legislation in
fulfillment of this goal. 20  Virginia's statute, the Chesapeake Bay
Preservation Act, creates a land management system for Tidewater Virginia.
113 Imperial notes that a "major weakness [in the Chesapeake Bay Program] as a model for
future programs is the extensive expenditure on scientific studies prior to management
action. The level of funding was unrealistic in contemporary, state-led estuarine efforts."
Imperial, Evolutionary Perspective on the National Estuary Program, supra note 67, at 325.
114 The program receives about $20 million a year through EPA's budget. EPA, FISCAL
YEAR 2000 ANNUAL PLAN (Jan. 1999) at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/budget/2000/2000
bib.pdf.
115 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
116 33 U.S.C. §1267 (1994).
117 See Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, supra note 75.
118Id.
119 1987 CHEsAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 73.
120 See VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-21001-2115 (Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES.
II § 8-1801 to 1816 (1990).
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"The statute calls for a cooperative approach between state and local
government, with most of the responsibility for implementation falling to
local governing bodies."'' The Executive Director of the Virginia board
charged under the statute with overseeing implementation has characterized
his agency as a "paper tiger," without the resources or legal authority to
secure compliance by local governments.'22 The Maryland statute, the
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection Program, while similar in many
ways to Virginia's, gives the state tighter control over planning and
implementation.123
The more hands-off approach adopted by Virginia might be
attributed to differences in the political cultures of the two states-
Virginians being more concerned about private property rights, with an
emphasis on personal stewardship, while Marylanders are more comfortable
with government regulation. It is also possible to see evidence in this story
of free riding by Virginia, as it benefits from reduced development in
Maryland, while at the same time failing to produce its share of reductions.
These problems have led at least one commentator to recommend creation
of "a compact granting regulatory authority over the Bay area to an interstate
agency." 24 And so back to the future.
In 1999, in an effort to shore up the land use commitments of the
parties, Maryland and other members proposed that each state agree to
reduce the rate of development of forest and agricultural lands by at least
thirty percent within ten years. 2 ' Virginia refused to accept the proposal,
arguing that Virginia has more open space, or fewer acres of developed land,
121 Note, The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act: The Problem with State Land Regulation
of Interstate Resources, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 735, 749 (1990).
122 Scott Harper, "Portsmouth Ignores Rules on Environmental Studies," VIRGINIA-
PILOT, Sept. 11, 2000 at B I. Virginia has since taken steps to enforce the statute's
requirements, suing one municipality for an insufficient Bay Act ordinance, see Scott
Harper, "Panel Votes to Sue Portsmouth: State Board Says City Has Ignored Chesapeake
Bay Preservation Act," VIRGINIA-PILOT, Sept. 19, 2000 at B1, and launching a formal
review of another's implementation scheme, Scott Harper and Lewis Kauskopf,
"Chesapeake Development Near Water Scrutinized," VIRGINIA-PILOT, Sept. 23, 2000 at
BI).
123 Id. at 753.
124 Id. at 771.
125 Steve Twomey, A 10-Year Plan for Cleaning the Bay, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1999, at BI.
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than Maryland or Pennsylvania, 126 and that the proposal would also usurp
local government authority over land use decisions.12 7  A draft of the
proposed agreement, noting Virginia's non-concurrence, became public,
contrary to an unwritten rule of confidentiality in negotiations among the
parties. For the first time in the history of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement,
the Governor of Virginia declined to personally attend the meeting of the
Executive Council in December 1999.2 Later, under pressure from other
partners to the Agreement as well as from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation
and other NGOs," 9 the Governor of Virginia agreed to accept an altered
version of the provision, which pushes the deadline to 2012 and applies the
development control target to the Chesapeake watershed as a whole, not to
individual states. 3 Although this provision represents some progress in
cooperative growth management in the watershed, it puts off for future
negotiations the key issue of allocation of specific responsibilities among the
states. Without the assignment of measurable obligations specific to each of
the parties, the problem of growth management in the region-assuming, as
the parties seem to, that it is a problem that should be addressed
collectively-has not been solved.
D. Environmental Effectiveness
Notwithstanding the difficulties with Virginia on the issue of land
use, our account indicates that the Chesapeake Bay Program has enhanced
cooperation among the parties. It might also be asked, though, in evaluating
the program, whether cooperation has actually changed conditions in the
Bay, compared to what would have been the case had the parties been left to
their own devices. The evidence on this question is unclear. There is
general agreement that the Bay is at least marginally better off now than it
was when the program was started. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation rates
the Bay's "condition at 28, up from 23 on a scale of 100, with 100 being
126 William C. Baker, Virginia Should Sign Agreement with Proposed Land Goals,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 2000, at A15.
127 Lawrence Latane III, Virginia Opposes Key Goal for Bay, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Dec. 9, 1999, atB4.
128 Patrick Lackey, Mushy Plans for Cleaning up the Bay, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk,
VA), Dec. 9, 1999, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Group File.
129 William Baker, supra note 126, at A15.
130 Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, supra note 75. The final agreement also
pledges to preserve from development twenty percent of the land area in the watershed
by 2010. Id.
[Vol.25:379
2000] CHOICES AND INSTITUTIONS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 405
equal to the bay's pristine status three centuries ago.'' In its recent report
on the state of the Bay, the Bay Program offers the following assessment:
The bottom line is that ... the Bay and many of its living
resources have come a long way since the 1970s. The Bay
can be considered a patient that's just been released from
intensive care and is recovering. Some of its vital signs are
improving, but we need to keep a very close watch on all the
signals' 3 1
Neither of these characterizations, however, answers the question of
whether, in the absence of a program, this incremental improvement in the
Bay's health would have occurred.
If one focuses on the Program's top priority since 1987, reducing
phosphorous and nitrogen loadings by forty percent by the year 2000,"33 the
picture is somewhat clearer. The targeted reduction was achieved for
phosphorous, and nitrogen loadings have declined, although the forty
percent reduction was not achieved. 34 Jaqueline Savitz argues that "[m]ost
improvements in the Chesapeake Bay are attributable not to the Bay
Program, but to the Clean Water Act permitting program, bans on phosphate
detergents enacted by state governments ... and sewage treatment plant
upgrades.' ' 35 The evidence seems to the contrary. The enactment of the
phosphate ban by the several states, coordinated by the Chesapeake Bay
Commission, was driven not by federally enforceable water quality
standards but by the program's nutrient reduction goals. 36  Similarly,
upgrades to advanced treatment by sewage treatment plants in the region
took place in spite of a national policy discouraging such treatment, and was
aided by advances in treatment technology (biological nutrient removal)
131 Twomey, supra note 125, at B1.
132 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: THE STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, supra note 89, at
Introduction.
133 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 73.
134 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE 2000 AND THE BAY: WHERE ARE WE AND
WHERE ARE WE GOING? (2000) at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/snapc2k.pdf.
135 Jacqueline Savitz, Compensating Citizens, 24 BOSTON REv. 5 (Oct.-Nov. 1999), at 17.
136 Telephone interview with Richard Batiuk, Deputy Director, Chesapeake Bay Program
Office (June 16, 2000).
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funded by the program. 137  Although sewage treatment plants are point
sources and thus might have been required by federal law to install advanced
treatment if necessary to meet water quality standards, water quality
standards for nutrients in the Bay do not exist and may be years in the future.
Although it might be argued that, in the absence of a cooperative program,
EPA would have been more aggressive in establishing and implementing
comprehensive water quality standards for the Bay, the Agency's historic
difficulty in dealing with transboundary pollution problems, as well as
substantial technical and scientific obstacles, would indicate otherwise.
Thus, the program should be credited with improvements over what might
have occurred in its absence. Significantly, however, the major remaining
source of phosphorous and nitrogen loadings to the Bay is nonpoint source
pollution.3 ' The ability of the program to achieve additional reductions
through cooperatively established nonpoint source control measures remains
to be determined. 3 9
E. Cost Effectiveness
Another measure of the Chesapeake Bay Program's effectiveness is
the ability to reduce implementation costs. The program's flexible
implementation scheme-allowing each state to select the measures for
fulfilling its commitments and reserving flexibility at the local level-might
enhance cost-effectiveness as well as political acceptability. But Bruce
Ackerman and Richard Stewart observe that regional institutions can reduce
the costs of environmental measures even further by providing markets in
pollution rights within a watershed or airshed."40 Having set a limit on total
loadings of a pollutant and having allocated rights to discharge specific
amounts of that pollutant to sources in the watershed consistent with
meeting the overall limit, a watershed body might allow sources to buy and
sell those rights among themselves. A regional trading regime would be
feasible for pollutants, such as nutrients, which have basin-wide effects.'
14
Trades could be expected to shift discharges of the pollutant from sources
137 Id.
138 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: THE STATE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY, supra note 89, at
24 (listing sources of nitrogen pollution to the Bay as nonpoint source (fifty-six percent),
point source (twenty-two percent), and atmospheric deposition (twenty-one percent) and
sources of phosphorous pollution as nonpoint source (sixty-six percent), point source
(twenty-five percent), and atmospheric (nine percent)).
139 For sources of atmospheric deposition located outside the watershed, the program is
largely dependent on federal Clean Air Act controls.
140 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 41.
41 See ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 92.
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with high control costs to those with low control costs, because it would be
cheaper for high cost controllers to purchase additional rights from low cost
controllers than to make the additional reductions themselves. This would
lower the overall costs of control, while ensuring the same level of
environmental benefits. The same might be the case for markets for water
withdrawals or habitat destruction (e.g., wetlands mitigation banks). Multi-
state trading schemes can be mandated by federal legislation, as was the case
with the acid rain provisions of 1990.42 However, regional institutions like
the Chesapeake Bay Program, with their scientific data and models,
professional staff, and cooperative traditions, offer an important alternative
breeding ground for these regimes.
Despite the potential benefits (in cost savings) to its regional
constituency, the Chesapeake Bay Program has not established a trading
regime; however, federal controls on point source discharges may limit the
scope of trading, undermining the development of well-functioning
allowance markets. A program task force is now exploring trading options,
which may offer the next level of program effectiveness.
IV. GENERALIZING FROM THE CHESAPEAKE
The tantalizing question that arises from an examination of the
Chesapeake Bay Program, or other relatively successful collaborative
programs, is why are these programs successful, when others are not? Can
we predict the settings in which collaborative forms of watershed
management will work? These are questions that, as Elinor Ostrom has
admonished regarding the management of common pool resources, we do
not have the ability to answer satisfactorily.'43 Multiple factors seem to
contribute to the success or failure of these institutions, and any definitive
understanding of the interactions among these factors, or their relative
influence, has proved elusive.
While acknowledging these limitations, I offer here a tentative
explanation of why the Chesapeake Bay Program seems to work, why other
collaborative watershed management efforts do not, and what this suggests
about the role of central governments in the "watershed approach." In this, I
am much indebted to Thomas Merrill's account of the dynamics of multi-
142 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7404, 7415, 7429, 7601, 7604, 7615, 7651, 7661e (2000).
143 See generally OSTROM, supra note 2.
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jurisdictional environmental problem-solving in the context of
transboundary pollution.'
I begin with the hypothesis that the difficulty of establishing
cooperative watershed institutions will be proportional to the number of
jurisdictions that must cooperate and the strength and diversity of interests
among those jurisdictions, including the presence or absence of common
environmental norms. 45 As we have seen, successful collaborative regimes
reduce transaction costs and foster results that make all of the parties better
off than they would be in the absence of cooperation. The elaborateness of
these regimes (that is, the amount of resources that the parties were willing
to invest in them) would be directly related to the benefits that the parties
could expect to flow from cooperation, i.e., the strength of their interest in
seeing watershed problems addressed. Thus, more important issues (with a
high payoff from cooperative solutions) would support a vigorous
commitment to collaborative institutions, whereas less important issues
(with a lower payoff from cooperation) would support less investment.
Thus, not every problem will warrant action on a basin-wide or even a local
watershed scale. Assuming all interests have been taken into account,
including the potential interests of those outside the watershed, this may be
properly understood not as a barrier to collaborative efforts, but simply as an
indication of whether, and to what extent, they are worth supporting.
Cooperation will also become more difficult as the number of parties
increases.'46 This is a function of the greater likelihood of holdouts or free
riders that may undermine the ability to reach or sustain an agreement and
the greater difficulty in establishing norms of cooperation in larger groups.
In large interstate watersheds, like the Chesapeake, which may include
hundreds or thousands of local jurisdictions and millions of citizens, this
problem can be managed by limiting the core deliberative group to state and
federal officials. These officials would serve as surrogates for their
respective constituencies and also have a degree of coercive authority within
their respective jurisdictions to effectuate their agreements. This
representational structure would reduce the collective action costs and allow
for the evolution of norms of cooperation among the principals, although it
would reduce direct citizen participation in watershed governance. In
144 See Merrill, supra note 45, at 972.
145 For comparable formulations of factors affecting emergence of collaborative regimes,
see OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS, supra note 2, at 211; Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing
Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 590 (1996); Merrill, supra note 45, at
976-84.
14 6 See OLSON, supra note 61, at 51-65; Merrill, supra note 45, at 975.
[Vol.25:379
2000] CHOICES AND INSTITUTIONS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT
watersheds composed of many co-equal jurisdictions, however, numerosity
may still present problems.'47
Finally, cooperation is more difficult if there are conflicting interests
among the parties. In the prisoner's dilemma game, each party is assumed
to have similar interests at stake; thus, the cooperative solution makes both
parties better off than they would be otherwise. In what Merrill styles the
"cooperator's loss game," however, the interests of the parties are
conflicting.'48
[E]ven if a strategy of mutual cooperation would increase the
parties' joint welfare, one party will always be worse off
cooperating than it will be if it refuses to cooperate .... Non-
cooperation is always the preferred strategy for the player
who will be worse off, unless some mechanism can be
devised for transferring part of the collective gains to this
player in order to induce him to switch to a cooperative
strategy.
149
In watershed management, conflicting interests among jurisdictions are
often due to the fact that water runs downhill. Pollution source (e.g.,
upstream) and recipient (e.g., downstream) jurisdictions may assess issues
differently: in the absence of controls, the upstream jurisdiction may be able
to externalize all or most of the costs of pollution on the downstream
jurisdiction. With controls, the downstream jurisdiction may reap the
benefits while all or most of the costs are born by the upstream jurisdiction.
Thus, to the extent that reducing pollution will entail costs to it, an upstream
jurisdiction may have little or no incentive to cooperate in clean-up efforts.
Similar asymmetries are likely on issues of water quantity where water users
will feel the costs of upstream water withdrawals entirely or mostly
downstream (including water-dependent flora and fauna). Divergence of
interests may also occur if different jurisdictions place a significantly
147 See OLSON, supra note 61, at 54 (citing findings from various studies distinguishing
effectiveness of groups of five to seven members from that of groups of twelve to fourteen
members); Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REv. 1371, 1387-89 (1998).
148 Merrill, supra note 45, at 974.
149 Id.
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different value on protecting the resource at issue. 5 ° The problem of
conflicting interests may be exacerbated by the participation of central
authorities in the cooperative effort, representing interests of those outside
the watershed as well as within it.
How well does our hypothesis (positing the number of jurisdictions
and the strength and diversity of interests among them as the pivotal factors)
explain the apparent success of the Chesapeake Bay Program? In that
program, the core policymaking group at the basin-wide level is relatively
small in number (i.e., the six members of the Executive Council). Basin
states with marginal interests in the Bay (New York, West Virginia,
Delaware), and marginal impacts on it, are not included in that group,
although the program works with these states to reduce their impacts. Local
governments, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens are
likewise not included; their interests are represented through the members of
the Council or the various advisory committees and other groups that inform
its decision-making. Although, as we have seen, cooperative efforts occur
throughout the interconnected forums that make up the program, the core
group plays an essential role in legitimizing, focusing, and supporting
collaborative activities. The literature suggests that five to seven members
may be an optimal number for an "action group."'' Watershed management
efforts involving a larger number of jurisdictions, such as the Great Lakes
Program (involving eight U.S. states and two Canadian provinces), have
shown success.'52  But watersheds with a much larger number of
jurisdictions, such as the Mississippi River, which drains all or part of more
15o See Esty, supra note 19, at 590-91 (on importance of "common environmental norms"
for cooperative action).
Is' See OLSON, supra note 61, at 54.
152 At the highest level, the Great Lakes effort can be understood as a two-party cooperative
undertaking, in which the United States and Canada have agreed on broad goals for the
Great Lakes Basin (e.g., "restoring the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem") and charged the International Joint Commission (IJC) to
assist in implementing their agreement. To assist it in this task, the IJC in turn has
appointed a Great Lakes Water Quality Board, with representatives from each of the eight
states and two provinces in the watershed. See Great Lakes Water Quality Board
Responsibilities, IJC Directive No. 1 to the Great Lakes Water Quality Board (March 14,
1980). Policy coordination among localities, states, tribes, and federal authorities within the
United States' portion of the watershed is facilitated through the Great Lakes National
Program Office. See 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (1994). For the Great Lakes, perhaps in view of its
international commitment, the United States government has adopted topdown approaches
not present in the Chesapeake Bay Program, such as the requirement that EPA issue federal
water quality "guidance," 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(2) (1994), constraining state water quality
standards and "implementation procedures" in the Basin.
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than two dozen states and portions of Canada as well, have had great
difficulty in establishing effective cooperation.153
The Chesapeake Bay ecosystem is also seen as a nationally
prominent, highly valued, at-risk resource, which-consistent with our
hypothesis-explains the elaborate and relatively costly institutional
structure supported by both state and federal resources. Even with
expenditures of tens of millions of dollars per year to maintain the
organizational and information infrastructure of the program, the benefits
generated by the program could be expected to justify the costs. Other
collaborative efforts of comparable geographical scope and complexity have
not received the same level of support. Lower investments in these
programs may simply reflect that the parties to those undertakings believe
they have less at stake. For example, the Gulf of Mexico Program is a state-
federal partnership to protect and restore the aquatic ecosystem of the Gulf
of Mexico, a resource of ecological and economic value that arguably equals
or exceeds the Chesapeake Bay's.5 4  Yet EPA's annual budgeted
contribution to that program is less than a third of its contribution to the
Chesapeake Bay Program, and the five states that ring the Gulf have
invested considerably less in their joint effort than their Chesapeake
counterparts in the Bay Program.' This difference may be due to the lack
of a compelling sense of environmental risk Gulf-wide or of a strong public
identification with the resource of the sort that characterizes the Chesapeake
Bay. (It may also be due to recognition that some of the Gulf's water
quality problems have their primary source in states along the Mississippi
River and other tributaries to the Gulf that are not participants in the
program.'56) Federal investment in nationally less prominent watersheds is
153 In the 1998 St. Louis Compact among EPA offices involved in the Mississippi, the
signatories noted: "The scale of the greater basin is such that it is difficult for those
managing government programs, much less the millions of enterprises and people
affecting the resource, to put their actions in a system-wide context." U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, St. Louis Compact, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/
compact.html.
154 Mary L. Belefski & Larinda Tervelt Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: A
Historical and Policy Perspective, 12 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 333 (1999).
155 EPA's budgeted funds for the Gulf of Mexico Program are $4.2M for FY2000. See
EPA's Summary of Budget, at http://www.epa.gov/ocfo/budget/2000/2000bib.pdf.
Governors of the Gulf States do not participate personally in program deliberations, as they
do in the Chesapeake. See Belefski & Norton, supra note 154, at 339.
15 6 See infra text accompanying notes 159-164.
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predictably even less. For efforts not among those specifically earmarked
for assistance in its budget, the EPA has appropriated only $5 million for
watershed assistance grants to be distributed nationwide."5 7
All this assumes that investments by the parties in collaborative
programs reflect their assessment of the potential benefits to their respective
publics. Distortions in the political process may undermine this assumption.
As I describe later in the paper, however, competition for governmental
assistance among watershed initiatives may contribute to a deliberative
process that minimizes such distortions.
We have seen evidence that the value placed on protecting the
Chesapeake Bay may differ among the jurisdictions involved the program,
which raises the last factor--diversity of interests. The Chesapeake Bay has
upstream (e.g., Pennsylvania) and downstream (e.g., Maryland, Virginia)
jurisdictions, but the potential differences in interests among them are more
complex than their physical alignment suggests.' Pennsylvania, for
example, is seen as cooperating in measures to protect the Bay. One can
hypothesize that efforts by it to reduce pollution in the Susquehanna and its
tributaries will result in environmental improvements in Pennsylvania as
well as on the main stem of the Bay, although the oxygen-depleting effects
of nutrient loadings from Pennsylvania are felt predominantly in the Bay.
Also, as appreciators and sometime users of the Bay, which is readily
accessible to many of them, Pennsylvanians will derive benefits from
improvements downstream. Thus, Pennsylvania's upstream status allows it
only to partially externalize the costs of its pollution and significant
incentives remain for it to participate. (Federal subsidies for sewage
treatment plant upgrades and non-point source programs may also have
offset some of the costs of improvements by Pennsylvania as well as other
states in the basin.)'59
On the main stem of the Bay, Maryland is upstream of Virginia.
However, this position may be less significant, in terms of our hypothesis,
for an estuary such as the Chesapeake, where tidal action means that water
moves both upstream and downstream, than for a free running river. 60 Each
157 EPA, FISCAL YEAR 200 BUDGET (Jan. 1999) at http://www.epa.gov/ofco/budget
(amount does not include National Estuary Program watersheds).
158 See Merrill, supra note 45, at 969-970 (discussing varying interest of states in regulating
multi-jurisdictional environmental issues).
159 Federal funds (subsidies) for elements of the pollution reduction programs advanced by
the program not only through appropriations earmarked for the Chesapeake Bay but also
through Title II of the Clean Water Act (subsidizing sewage treatment plant construction
and upgrades), Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1977 §319(h), 33 U.S.C. §
1281(1994) (grants to states for nonpoint source controls), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h) (1994).
160 Freshwater drainage from the Bay's tributaries "tends to flow seaward along the surface
of the estuary while heavier saline water from the ocean travels northward along the
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state may be able to externalize some of the costs of its pollution on the
other, but each is also adversely affected by pollution from the other. Thus,
each has incentives to cooperate in a mutual pollution reduction scheme that
produces net benefits for both states.
From our account of interactions among the parties in the
Chesapeake Bay agreement, however, Virginia appears to behave vis-6i-vis
Pennsylvania and Maryland more like an upstream state might be expected
to behave, lagging in fulfilling its commitments and resisting additional
commitments that might impose significant costs.' It is possible, as we
have suggested, that this behavior simply represents efforts by Virginia to
free ride on the efforts of Pennsylvania and Maryland. It is also possible
that it represents conflicting interests occasioned not by a different physical
relationship to the resource, but by a different relative value that the citizens
of Virginia or their representatives in state government express for the
resource itself. This different valuation may reflect less collective concern
for the environment or, in what may amount to the same thing, greater
concern for competing values, such as property rights and economic
development. Virginia may believe that protective measures advanced by
the other parties impose costs on it that more than offset the benefits it
receives as a downstream state. In resisting the new provision of the Bay
Agreement calling for specific reduction in the rate of conversions of
farmland and woodlands, for example, the Virginia Secretary for Natural
Resources argued that Virginia has more open space than either Maryland
or Pennsylvania,'62 implying that Virginia would be relatively disadvantaged
in realizing economic gains from development that were already being
enjoyed by Maryland and Pennsylvania. The factual basis for those claims
has been disputed,'63 but it does appear that Virginia has been developing at
a greater rate than Maryland or Pennsylvania and thus may view itself as
differently affected by the percentage reduction measure and a net loser
bottom." In the Chesapeake Bay, friction between the layers "cause[s] mixing at all depths
and . . .an exchange of water across the density barriers." CHRISTOPHER P. WHITE,
CHESAPEAKE BAY FIELD GUIDE 17 (1989).
161 William Baker, Virginia Should Sign Agreement with Proposed Land Goals, THE
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 2000, at A15.
16 Id.
163 Id.
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under it."64 In any event, Virginia's behavior indicates the extent to which
the perception, by one of the parties, of a divergence of interests may
complicate the collaborative process.'65 Just as importantly, however, the
Chesapeake Bay Program, which has enjoyed success notwithstanding the
difficulties we have identified, illustrates that compatibility or conflicting
interests are matters of degree. Thus, even in the absence of perfect
compatibility of interests, mutually beneficial cooperation can occur.
More profoundly conflicting interests may explain the lack of any
credible interstate effort, so far at least, to address the problem of
agricultural pollution in the Mississippi River Basin.'6 6  In that region,
nitrate-rich runoff from fertilized fields in the combelt states of Minnesota,
Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio contributes substantially to a seasonal, New
Jersey-sized, low-dissolved-oxygen zone in the Gulf of Mexico.1 67 Nutrient
run-off causes local water quality problems, 6 but the dominant oxygen-
depleting effects are felt far downstream in the Gulf.169 Although these
states occupy a position similar in some ways to Pennsylvania's in the case
of the Chesapeake, they are more remote from the Gulf and have less at
stake in its protection. 7° In the absence of a cost-shifting mechanism, they
would also bear a proportionately much greater share of the total costs of
effective regional controls, which will be substantial, 7' than does
164 Population figures for the three states show that in the last ten years the population of
Virginians in the Basin has increased at a greater rate (fourteen percent) than the population
of Marylanders (eleven percent) or Pennsylvanians (five percent). Population Estimates
and Projections for Portions of States in the Chesapeake Bay Drainage Basin, at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/info/popstate.htm.
165 It is also possible that partisan political considerations may be at work, as Virginia's
Governor is a Republican and Maryland's Governor is a Democrat, as is the current EPA
leadership. This possibility is discounted, however, by the fact that Pennsylvania's
Governor, who has supported the land use restriction, is a Republican.
166 See text accompanying note 153 supra.167 NAT'L SC. & TECH. COUNCIL, COMM. ON ENv'T & NAT. RESOURCES, AN INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT: HYPOXIA IN THE NORTHERN GULF or MEXICO 22-23 (2000).
168 See id. at 25-26.
169 For an account of a similar situation at a smaller scale, see Esty, supra note 19, at 590
(Connecticut River).
170 See Mary L. Belefski & Larinda Tervelt Norton, Hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico: A
Historical and Policy Perspective, 12 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 331, 346 (1999) (noting that
hypoxia in the Gulf is "difficult to connect sociologically and emotionally with
constituencies located far from the Gulf').
171 NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 167, at 37-45.
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Pennsylvania. Thus they are much more likely than Pennsylvania to see
themselves as net losers in a cooperative arrangement.' 72
In a case of conflicting interests, a downstream state still might enter
into a Coasean bargain' with an upstream state. A bargain might be based
on payments by the downstream state that would serve to make both parties
better off.74 It may be difficult, however, to reduce watershed protection to
a dollar amount,'75 and the downstream jurisdiction may find such a
payment politically unpalatable. Alternatively, the bargain might involve a
trade on other issues, where the states have other resource or economic
issues in common. In the case of a multi-issue watershed protection effort
such as the Chesapeake Bay program, there might be opportunities for trades
on different aspects of the Bay's management (e.g., trade-offs between
pollution control measures and quotas for the taking of living resources such
as oysters or crabs 76). Where the watershed is dominated by a single
problem, however, and where the states do not have other issues on which to
trade, a bargain between co-equal jurisdictions might not occur, even though
a cooperative solution would leave the parties better off overall.
This analysis is consistent with our hypothesis that, in multi-
jurisdictional watersheds, collaborative successes are more likely if small
numbers of jurisdictions are involved, if the resource is important and
172 The failure of cooperative approaches in the Platte River Basin, involving downstream
effects of water diversion by upstream jurisdictions, is also predictable on this basis. See
John Echeverria, The Limits of Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management:
The Case of the Platte River, Address at the Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. Symp.,
Water Rights and Watershed Management: Planning for the Future (Mar. 31, 2000).
173 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
" Id. at 6-8.
175 See Nickelsburg, supra note 147, at 1390.
176 Maryland and Virginia harvest similar numbers of blue crabs each year, subject to
regulations established by each of the states for its portion of the Bay. The crabs are not
equally distributed between the states, however. Male crabs predominate in Maryland's
waters, while female crabs are far more abundant in Virginia waters, toward the mouth of
the Bay, where they spawn. The future abundance of crabs in both states is therefore
dependent on measures taken by Virginia to protect female crabs. See Craig Timberg,
Virginia Is for Crabs, WASH. POST, June 28, 2000, at B 1. Thus, whereas the flow of
externalities from water pollution may be predominantly downstream, the flow of
externalities from crab harvesting practices may be predominantly in the other direction.
Complexities such as this help equalize the bargaining leverage of each of the states and
enhance the likelihood of welfare maximizing solutions across the range of issues.
415
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
perceived to be at risk, and if the interests of the jurisdictions are relatively
compatible. Although even more difficult to assess objectively, other
factors, such as qualities of leadership and institutional capacity within the
region, may also be at work. 7 7 Also, as we have seen, success can be
strongly influenced by the role played in the collaborative enterprise by a
central authority.
V. TOWARD A MORE NUANCED ROLE FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
That negotiated solutions may be more difficult in some situations
does not mean that they are impossible, given the availability of carrots or
sticks administered through central governments. In addition to reducing
transaction costs, as we have seen, central governments can also change the
cost-benefit calculation of parties where interests are conflicting. A central
government might subsidize an "upstream" jurisdiction, absorbing some or
all of the additional costs of resource protection. The success of the
Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Program, for example, in a watershed
otherwise rent with bickering among states over river management issues, is
at least partially attributable to federal payments for salt-reducing projects in
upstream jurisdictions.'78 The central authority may also impose regulations
on the upstream jurisdiction requiring protective measures, or it might offer
some combination of subsidies and regulations. Subsidies can help address
the distributional inequities of polluter-pays regulation and reduce political
resistance in upstream jurisdictions, which has been effective in the past in
limiting control of transboundary pollution. In the Mississippi River Basin,
a federal task force has proposed a draft plan to address the Gulf of
Mexico's hypoxia problem.'79 Emphasizing the national interests at stake,
the draft plan proposes a new federal restoration fund to subsidize measures
in upstream states to reduce nutrient loadings to the Gulf and vigorous
application of existing federal regulatory requirements.8 0
177 See, e.g., MARK T. IMPERIAL & TIMOTHY HENNESSEY, ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
IN WATERSHEDS: THE IMPORTANCE OF COLLABORATION TO INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
68 (2000) (draft report prepared for National Academy of Public Administration); CARON
CHESS & GINGER NELSON, THE NAVESINK WATERSHED MANAGEMENT EFFORT 27-33
(2000) (draft report prepared for National Academy of Public Administration).
'
7 8 See ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 58, 61.
179 See Notice of Availability and Request for Comment on Draft Plan of Action for
Reducing, Mitigating, and Controlling Hypoxia in the Northern Gulf of Mexico, 65 Fed.
Reg. 42690 (July 11, 2000). The proposal responds to a requirement in the Harmful Algal
Bloom and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998, H.R. 2204, 105th Cong., §
604(b)(1 998), that the federal task force, "in conjunction with the chief executive officers of
the States," submit a plan to the President no later than March 30, 2000.80 See DRAFT PLAN, supra note 179, at 42695-96.
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Thus, the new watershed approach anticipates that central authorities
will not only devolve (to allow localized solutions to local problems) and
facilitate (to reduce transaction costs), but also assert themselves through
either their tax-and-spend or regulatory authority (to address situations
where asymmetries may prevent beneficial cooperation among co-equal
jurisdictions or where national interests otherwise require action).
Depending on the context, the central authority may be called upon to play
all these roles at once. How successful central governments are in
discharging this diverse set of functions in a contextually appropriate way
will largely determine the success of the new watershed approach.
Although central governments already administer subsidies and
regulatory schemes affecting watersheds, collaborative watershed
management suggests a more tailored approach than now characterizes
many of these programs. Some federal funds are allocated according to the
assessed needs of watersheds, but other funds are not.' Federal agencies
should have the flexibility to distribute those funds in a way that maximizes
their welfare-enhancing potential across a range of watershed management
efforts. Federal funding should focus on collaborative efforts that involve
multi-state watersheds or aquatic systems within a single state that are of
national importance, such as the Everglades or the California Bay Delta.
Similarly, the EPA and other federal authorities should have the flexibility
to tailor regulatory controls to the circumstances of particular watersheds in
order to maximize benefits to the affected community.
For the EPA, recently introduced federal legislation-the Second
Generation of Environmental Improvement Act' 2---could provide the
desired regulatory flexibility. Based on reinvention pilot programs, such as
Project XL, the legislation would authorize "innovative strategy
agreements" with interstate bodies, states and localities, among others. EPA
could modify regulatory requirements based on its finding that an innovative
agreement would produce "better environmental results" than enforcement
of existing requirements.' 83  Of particular relevance to watershed
management, better environmental results could include demonstrating new
181 See IMPERIAL, supra note 177, at 98 (noting tendency of Section 319 (non-point source)
funds to be distributed as "green pork").
182 H.R. 3448, 106th Cong. (1999) (introduced by Reps. Greenwood, Dooley, Boehlert, and
Tauscher).
... Id. at § 203(a)(1). An agreement would also require adequate monitoring of
environmental results and broad public support. Id. at § 203(a)(2)-(3).
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methods of nonpoint source pollution control or resource conservation.' 4
This legislation would legitimize trade-offs of regulatory stringency in
pursuit of environmental goals that naturally occur in bargaining with states,
localities, and private entities, and would impose criteria to ensure that the
trade-offs were in the public interest.
To maximize EPA's effectiveness as a watershed partner, Congress
should increase the Agency's discretion to redirect funds authorized for
distribution to the states, subject to conditions similar to those that would
apply to the Agency's exercise of regulatory flexibility. Enhanced
flexibility in the relevant funding programs of other federal agencies could
provide additional leverage. Finally, Congress should provide expansive
authorization for trading among both point source and nonpoint source
dischargers.
Their complex role in watershed management also requires that
central authorities be able to assert themselves. Because of the political
sensitivity of transboundary environmental problems, central regulatory
regimes in the U.S. have had difficulty in dealing with them. 5 EPA's
recent successes in addressing interstate problems, such as acid rain and
regional ozone transport, are due at least in part to amendments to the Clean
Air Act in 1990 that strengthened and elaborated the Agency's authorities.'86
Although EPA has some authority to deal with interstate water pollution
problems, 87 it has no effective regulatory authority to deal with non-point
source pollution as a major source of remaining water quality problems.
Although currently less appealing than increasing Agency flexibility,
granting EPA authority to regulate non-point source pollution--contingent
perhaps on the absence of an effective collaborative program-would
enhance its ability to manage transboundary issues and other watershed
issues of national import.
The threat of federal controls can be used to drive collaborative
efforts, or if those efforts fail, controls may be imposed unilaterally. A
number of interstate watershed institutions, including collaborative ventures
such as those on the Platte River and the Columbia River Basin, have arisen
184 H.R. 3448, at § 203(c)(3) (1999).
185 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341 (1996); Merrill, supra note 45, at 932 ("Notwithstanding the broad
general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in environmental law, . . . little
meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists.").
186 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (acid rain provisions added by 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments);
42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(D), 7426(b) (reflecting expansion of EPA's mandate to address
interstate air pollution).
18 7 See ADLER ET AL., supra note 67, at 15; Merrill, supra note 45, at 946.
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directly in response to imminent federal regulatory intervention.' This
suggests the efficacy of threatened central regulatory controls in overcoming
transaction costs and conflicting interests among upstream and downstream
jurisdictions. But "agreeing to a regional institution does not constitute
agreement upon regional aims and goals.., or even a commitment to make
the regional institution work."'89 Collaborative watershed endeavors may be
used by participants to mask lack of substantive progress on issues
important to the public.9 In collaborative settings, it may be more difficult
for the public to know how decisions are being made, to monitor success,
and to hold officials involved in those efforts accountable. Central
authorities may use collaborative processes as a way of "passing the buck"
or avoiding accountability.' Also, having committed to a collaborative
effort, central authorities may "find themselves caught up in the inertia of
negotiations even when they doubt, or should doubt, that the resulting
agreement will ... serve the public interest."' 92 Thus, it will be important
that central authorities be able to assert the broader public interest if it is not
being served, even to the extent of unilateral action outside the cooperative
framework. More generally and perhaps paradoxically, the ability of each of
the parties in a collaborative setting to assert its interests independent of the
others may be essential to the legitimacy and welfare-maximizing potential
of the group enterprise.
VI. TRANSFORMATIVE ASPECTS OF WATERSHED INSTITUTIONS
The image I have drawn of collaborative watershed institutions, as
forums for bargaining among their participants, has generally assumed fixed
preferences and interests among citizens and government actors. It does not
'
8 8 Northwest Resource Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1377-78 (9th Cir. 1994).
189 See Ingram, supra note 9, at 12.
190 Even the venerable Chesapeake Bay Program has been accused of providing a
smokescreen to hide maintenance of the status quo. Tayloe Murphy, former Chair,
Chesapeake Bay Commission, Comments at the Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev.
Symp., Water Rights and Watershed Management: Planning for the Future (Mar. 31,
2000).
191 George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary Case Against
Devolved Collaboration, 25 Ecology L. Q. 602-3 (1999).
192 Cary Coglianese, The Limits of Consensus, 41 ENV'T 28, 32 (April 1999).
419
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
capture the potential of these institutions over time to transform the way we
think and act, individually and collectively, about watersheds. In this
section, I address claims that collaborative arrangements, such as we saw in
the Chesapeake Bay Program, may have a transformative effect. These
claims include aspirational elements that help explain watershed
management's broad appeal.
A. Redefining the Interests of the Bargaining Parties
Although collaboration does involve interest bargaining, it may alter
the way in which parties view their own interests, or it may alter those
interests. Jody Freeman has disputed the adequacy of "interest
representation theory" or "the vocabulary of pluralism" to fully explain what
happens in successful collaborative efforts.'93 Although these efforts still
"involve bargaining and the pursuit of self-interest,"' 94 they provide a
deliberative setting in which parties can reconceptualize a problem or
reinterpret their own interests to reach a resolution. 9 ' Thus, although recent
Virginia Governors may see their interest as a strong defense of property
rights, their involvement in the long-term cooperative venture of the
Chesapeake Bay Program-with its own norms-may lead them to
reconceptualize that interest in a way that is compatible with minimizing ill
effects of development on the Bay, e.g., "smart growth" incentive programs
in lieu of traditional land use regulation. The norms developed through the
Program might also be seen as altering the interests of the member
jurisdictions or their representatives on the Council. The norm of
cooperation among members of the Council, for example, may amount to
more than an expectation of cooperative behavior on the part of each of
them, established through repeat encounters under threat of retaliation for
uncooperative behavior, as in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. It may operate
as a social norm that individual members feel obligated to follow because of
their desire for the "good opinion or respect" of other members or their own
"internalized sense of duty."' 96 These perceived obligations may produce
higher levels of cooperation than would be predicted by a purely game-
193 Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1, 5 (1997).
194 Id. at 71-72.
195 See Sabel et al., supra note 10, at 4 ("Further deliberation leads to successive
redefitions of self-interest that permit robust collaborative exploration.").
19' Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 338, 340, 355 (1997); Robert C. Ellickson, Social Norms, Social Meaning, and the
Economic Analysis of Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998) (noting the importance of
"informal enforcement of social mores" in maintaining societal control).
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theoretic account of interactions among the parties. The evolution of social
norms around the announced substantive goals of the program also has the
capacity to change the interests of the parties in this way.'97 Although this
dynamic may be seen as principally affecting those directly involved in the
program (as members of the Executive Council, an advisory committee, or
watershed team), watershed institutions also have the corresponding
potential to change citizen preferences as well, as I discuss below.
Evolution of citizen preferences, in turn, can alter the interests of the states
(as interpreted by the elected officials who represent them) and other
institutional players as well.
B. Transforming Citizen Preferences9"
An express tenet of EPA's community-based environmental
protection program is to "build a sense of stewardship" around places. 99 A
goal of the Chesapeake Bay Agreement is "to foster individual responsibility
and stewardship of the Bay's resources."2 '° In addition to the programmatic
goals and commitments advanced by the parties, the Chesapeake Bay
Program works to stimulate watershed awareness, including posting
watershed boundary signs on interstate highways leading into and out of the
watershed, stenciling reminders on stormwater inlets that runoff from streets
in the watershed ends up in the Bay, and sponsoring watershed teams and
197 This dynamic can also cut in the opposite direction, if norms develop that countenance
non-cooperation or disregard for watershed resources. Based on his recent empirical study
of a half dozen watershed management efforts, Imperial concluded that "the social norms
created peer pressure at the individual, professional, and political level that encouraged
implementation activities. Conversely, the social norms that developed in Narragansett
Bay help actors justify their lack of participation." IMPERIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE IN WATERSHEDS, supra note 177, at 107.
198 'Preferences' are not exclusive of, and may be strongly influenced by, social values or
norms. See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic
Mephistopheles, or, Value By Any Other Name is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1631,
1635-39 (1989) (book review). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLuM. L. REv. 903, 909 (1996) (arguing that the idea of 'preferences' is inadequate for
both positive and normative examinations of people's choices).
199 EPA, FRAMEWORK FOR COMMUNITY-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note
3, at 12.
200 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 73. Similar recognition of individual
stewardship appears in Chesapeake 2000: A Watershed Partnership, supra note 75.
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citizen water quality monitoring. These ventures are designed not only to
inform the public about the Bay and engage the help of citizens but also, in a
way that has strong normative implications, to connect people to the Bay
and establish a sense of community with others in the watershed. Although
messages from governments will not be accepted by everyone (and may be
actively resisted by some), these efforts might be expected to alter or
intensify the preferences of at least some citizens in a way that favors
cooperative efforts to protect the Bay.2'
Institutional shaping of citizen preferences may be even more
pronounced in the activities of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other
watershed-oriented NGOs. Jonathan Macey has documented the power of
mediating institutions such as membership organizations to transform the
interests of their members.20 2 "[M]ediating institutions focus, amplify, and
shape the interests and policy preferences of their members. Members rely
on their institutions for information on what they should believe.... [E]ven
their independently informed preferences are sharpened, and often shaped,
by their membership."2 3 Thus, rather than simply reflecting or seeking to
ensure that existing preferences of their members are reflected in decisions
about the Bay, the Chesapeake Bay Program's NGO counterparts, such as
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, are actively engaged in the process of
shaping constituent support for stronger protection programs. The ubiquity
of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's "Save the Bay" bumper sticker
throughout the region is perhaps tribute to their success. One might expect
that those holding contrary preferences would form competing groups,
seeking to shape preferences in different directions. Perhaps such
institutions exist in the form, for example, of property rights organizations or
associations of developers or farmers. However, I am aware of no
201 Compare Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995) (noting roles of government in "constructing social meanings"), Cass R. Sunstein,
Law, Economics and Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021,
2029-33 (defining the "expressive" function of law in changing social norms); Mark
Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible
Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411, 443 (2000) (concluding that government efforts
to change fringe-group norms against cooperation are risky and may increase resistance to
cooperation); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Norms: Economic and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1739 (1996) (noting that if undesirable norms are "the
result of deeply felt sentiments, then government action is unlikely to change the norm, and
may even strengthen it").
202 Jonathan R. Macey, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the PublicPrivate Distinction:
Packaged Preferences and the Institutional Transformation of Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REv.
1443 (1994).
201 Id. at 1475.
[Voi.25:379422
2000] CHOICES AND INSTITUTIONS IN WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 423
organizations that directly oppose the mission of the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation and its fellow NGOs.
Whether and to what extent regional consciousness and a
stewardship ethic are strengthened by watershed institutions, such as the
Chesapeake Bay Program and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, should be
capable of empirical verification. From her vantage point of nearly thirty
years ago, Ingram found generally that "[t]here is no solid evidence that
social awareness of regions is on the increase."2 4  A survey by the
Chesapeake Bay Program in 1994 showed predominantly high-to-moderate
familiarity with the Bay and concern for its health among residents of the
watershed. 5 However, those survey results do not reveal the causes of that
awareness and concern, nor do they provide a basis for comparing awareness
in 1994 to other periods in the Bay's history. A 1999 public survey by the
Chesapeake Bay Foundation showed that people were increasingly likely, as
a general matter, to perceive the Bay as healthy and its problems as less
severe than in 1995.26 At the same time, when asked to evaluate threats to
the health of the Bay on a list of specific problems (such as nutrient
pollution, loss of wetlands, loss of oysters, sprawl), respondents viewed
nearly every problem as more of a threat than in a similar survey conducted
in 1997.207 The lower concern about the general health of the Bay is
consistent with the recent reports of improvements in the Bay's overall
condition. The increased concern over specific issues-including issues
publicly identified as critical by the Program and the Chesapeake Bay
Foundation-suggests a continued and perhaps even heightened sensitivity
to the Bay's problems. It remains to be explored to what extent this
sensitivity might reflect the longer term evolution of citizen preferences in
support of watershed programs.
C. Transforming the Democratic Process
To the extent that watershed institutions do reshape preferences, we
might expect those preferences, so transformed, to have an impact on the
choices that citizens make through traditional political processes, e.g.,
204 Ingram, supra note 9, at 11.
205 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY ATITUDES SURVEY, Apr. 28, 1994, at
1,3.
206 Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Survey Results (Nov. 1999) (on file with author).
207 Id.
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choosing their elected officials or engaging in public debate. However,
Sabel, Fung and Karkkainen envision a further effect of these institutions on
the democratic process. By engaging citizens in watershed decision-making
processes at the local (tributary) level, they argue, these institutions also
have the ability to move decision-making to a more directly participatory,
and therefore democratic mode. They contrast the Chesapeake Bay Program
and similar collaborative efforts to decision-making by a distant political or
administrative elite buffered from everyday concerns and conclude that
these programs offer at least the possibility "that participation of a directly
deliberative kind, far from being a charge against efficiency, may be today a
precondition for it."208
As these authors acknowledge, however, their claims will require
further development and validation. Local watershed teams, for example,
may engage citizens in developing information and advising
decisionmakers, but they are not given final responsibility for making
decisions on behalf of the community. At least formally, officials within
existing governmental structures retain that responsibility. It remains
unclear to what extent expanded opportunities for citizen involvement can
be expected to alter outcomes that would otherwise be produced by those
structures. To the extent that what is envisioned is a de facto shift of
decision-making authority to public/private groups, there will be questions
about whether these arrangements satisfy representational norms. Kenny
cites evidence that, in an effort to empower local collaborative groups, non-
local policy makers may give those groups more credence than local
government, even in areas of local government responsibility. 9 This may
raise concerns over whether members of the local watershed associations are
representative of their community and how they are to be held accountable.
Deference to local stakeholder groups also raises the concern that
prerogatives of the community of place not eclipse the concerns of the
potentially larger community in interest.
Despite these concerns and the need for more empirical study, one
senses that public involvement in the program, through multiple forums, is
robust and relatively balanced and that the interaction of governmental and
citizens groups at multiple levels enhances the deliberative quality of the
decision-making process. The stewardship community that the program set
out self-consciously to foster seems, in some substantial form, to exist and to
be influential in watershed policymaking-witness the Governor of
Virginia's approval of no-net-loss wetlands legislation over the objections of
208 Sabel et al., supra note 10, at 10.
209 Kenny, supra note 28, at 58 n. I10 (citing survey by Deborah D. Paulson and Katherine
M. Chamberlin, Guidelines and Issues to Consider in Planning a Collaborative Process)
(Inst. for Env't and Nat. Resources, Univ. of Wyo.) (1998).
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special interests. Thus, the ideal of deliberative democratic institutions
organized around place--variously described as "civic environmentalism,"
"backyard environmentalism," or "watershed democracy"-begins to find
expression here. Unlike purer forms of localism or bio-regionalism,
however, this ideal includes representatives of national interests in the
deliberative process.
VII. COLLABORATIVE INSTITUTIONS AS ACTORS IN A BROADER FIELD
Like other institutions, watershed institutions, once they coalesce,
will exhibit interests of their own. Those interests may conflict with the
interests of other institutions. For example, place-based efforts such as the
Chesapeake Bay Program represent, in some important ways, an alternative
to traditional line programs within EPA and other federal agencies. The
demand by these programs for high level political attention, money, and
other agency resources may compete with the demands of the line programs.
These place-specific investments may be seen as draining resources from
programs that are designed to advance improvements in water quality more
generally and to promote watershed management nationwide as well as to
address other environmental and resource issues.
Watersheds (or entities representing them) not only compete against
line programs, they also compete against each other. Although most
regions, including multi-state river basins, are not anxious to provoke more
intense regulatory activity by the federal government (concentrating costs on
actors within the region), they are anxious to attract federal funds that can
help promote cooperation in watershed management, subsidize beneficial
projects, and provide local or regional economic benefits. Regional
institutions provide a conduit for seeking and receiving that attention. For
example, the Gulf of Mexico Program was created and funded largely at the
insistence of members of Congress and other officials from the Gulf region
who were concerned that the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay programs
were attracting large amounts of federal funds for research, monitoring,
education, and public participation. They argued that the Gulf of Mexico
was certainly as important to the nation as the Great Lakes and the
Chesapeake and should therefore receive its fair share of federal resources to
address its problems. °
210 Support for a strong regional institution in the Gulf is qualified by concerns about
intensified federal regulatory attention, and perhaps for this reason, the Gulf Program is less
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Competition among places for national recognition (and resources)
can take the form of public appeals. Although it involves in-state rather than
interstate resources, the rivalry between advocates for Louisiana's wetlands
and Florida's Everglades is illuminating. In endeavoring to attract federal
support for conservation of the vast wetlands of the Mississippi Delta,2 1'
Louisiana has complained publicly that the Everglades have received vastly
larger federal sums for restoration than its wetlands,"' even though
"Louisiana's problems are just as pressing." '213 To correct this disparity,
Louisiana engaged entertainment figures in a campaign to galvanize national
awareness of, and support for, the protection of the Mississippi Delta
system. Thus, we see the institutional surrogates for large aquatic systems
competing to shape the preferences of citizens outside their place in a
struggle for central resources. They seek canonization of their place, their
watershed, as among places of national concern warranting national
resources.
Similar patterns of behavior are evident among watershed NGOs.
The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, for example, competes against national
environmental groups for members and scarce contributions. To the extent
that it draws membership support from outside the watershed of the Bay, the
Foundation is also competing against other place-based environmental
groups for that support. Thus, it has an interest in advancing the perception
that the Bay and the threats to its integrity are more important, and therefore
more deserving of contributions, than other places of concern.
As we have seen with traditional institutions, watershed institutions
may also find it to their advantage to cooperate. For example, in what
amounts to a joint bid for federal funding, the President of the Chesapeake
Bay Foundation recently testified before Congress on behalf of a coalition of
regional watershed bodies that "unabashedly represents a very special
interest-the restoration and protection of this nation's coastal estuaries."2 4
The coalition sought support for legislation to improve watershed planning
visible than the Chesapeake Bay or the Great Lakes Programs, and federal legislation to
establish the program has not passed.
211 Congress created a structure for federal-state cooperation and financial assistance in the
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 101-646 § 302. 104
Stat. 4778 (1990) (often referred to as the "Breaux Bill").
212 The Clinton administration has endorsed a federal-state effort to restore the Florida
Everglades that will cost approximately $8 billion. "The federal-state effort to save coastal
Louisiana totals about $40 million per year." Ryan Clinton, 'New Orleans, Like Venice, Is
Sinking:' A Case Study of the Vanishing Louisiana Wetlands at 35 (paper on file with
author).
213 Id. at 35.214 Testimony of Will Baker, supra note 94.
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and coordination efforts for estuaries and, not incidentally, increase federal
funds for habitat restoration in coastal systems.
215
One might be concerned that this competition among watershed
interests, and the accommodation of those interests at the national level,
might represent just another form of interest group politics. To what extent
does federal support for a watershed's restoration reflect a deliberative
judgment about the importance of that watershed, rather than simply the
relative political influence of its boosters? Clearly the Chesapeake Bay
Program has benefited from large federal investments in information and
logistical support. Those investments were due in significant part to the
influence of Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland, an ardent Bay
advocate, first as Chair and more recently as Ranking Minority Member of
the Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for EPA's budget. Would
they have been made without her efforts? Similarly, it might be questioned
whether the large investments planned for the Everglades restoration might
be related to the large number of electoral votes in Florida, although number
of electoral votes would probably have a higher correlation with potential
public benefits than committee position. National support for watershed
restoration, like the earlier generation of water development projects, might
be seen as green pork.
However, over time the debate about which places are most
deserving of national recognition might be expected to yield choices that
reflect the preferences of the nation, not just the relative political influence
of regional interests. One might think of this as a process of canonization of
place with some places, such as the Grand Canyon, having clearly achieved
canonical status, others, such as the Chesapeake Bay, claiming such status
but still subject perhaps to further testing, and still others, such as the
Mississippi Delta, struggling for national recognition. Competition among
places aids the winnowing process.
Similarly, the competition among watershed-based organizations and
their national or generic counterparts may yield deliberative benefits. It may
provide legislators, other policy-makers, and the public with choices about
what kinds of efforts, at what levels, are most productive. By offering
alternatives to generic central programs, watershed programs allow
decisionmakers to balance their investments between place-based and line
programs, depending on the benefits that flow from each. Line programs
215 See, e.g., H.R. 1775, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 12, 1999); S. 835, 106th Cong., 2d
Sess. (April 20, 1999).
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will continue to be necessary, as we have seen, because they can help
stimulate and discipline the formation and operation of watershed efforts,
and because they can ensure a level of protection in watersheds for which-
for whatever reason-effective watershed institutions do not exist. Yet,
competition by watershed institutions for recognition and funding ensures
that the often more focused, collaborative and publicly supported place-
based programs are considered.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Collaborative watershed institutions, like the Chesapeake Bay
program, will be more difficult to establish in some settings than in others
and, where transaction costs are high by comparison to the benefits to be
achieved, may not be pursued at all. Their success will often depend upon
both resources and authorities at a central level in order to reduce transaction
costs, to address conflicting interests among jurisdictions, and to ensure that
the broader set of interests outside the watershed is represented. They
challenge EPA and other central authorities "simultaneously [to facilitate,]
command and devolve" 6 and call for increased flexibility and new
measures of accountability to ensure the use of those authorities to best
advantage. Where they fail, centrally imposed solutions may be necessary.
However, where they succeed, these institutions offer seductive possibilities:
to develop and refine our sense of what it means to live together as citizens
of a watershed, and of a nation of watersheds, and to produce policies and
actions worthy of that sense.
216 DeWitt John, Good Cops, Bad Cops, 24 BOSTON REv. 5 (Oct.-Nov. 1999), at 16.
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